Secrets of the CIA

6 JUN 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services FROM: Director of Security 1. This memorandum is for information only. 2. In July 1971, the New York Times featured an article under the by-line of William Beecher which contained an exposition of the then current status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It was evident from this delineation of these talks that William Beecher had obtained the information from highly classified U.S. Government documents or from a person or persons having had access to such documents. 3. In this regard, Mr. Egil E. Krogh, Jr of the White House telephonically contacted the Director of Security of this Agency and requested that this Agency provide a polygraph examiner to conduct polygraph tests on four Department of State employees. In conjunction with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, this Office arranged for a polygraph examiner to conduct these examinations but with no...

1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States. Clearly, the design and development of our intelligence equipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experiments, of necessity, reveal domestic information. 2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows: a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is ...

Executive Office of the President ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem. (Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) Office of Telecommunications Policy Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD. Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown. BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning a Radar People Detector developed for OSD. USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has...

A. SRPOINTER Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished. B. AELADLE For several years the Office of Security has provided support to Anatole Golitsyn, a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff. C. REDFACE I In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved bypassing a contact and sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe wit...

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from the Washington Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two WFO Agents, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations. B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Poli...

A. [...] During the periods of 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of [...], a former staff employee, and [...] a Cuban national with whom [...] become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that [...] had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by [...] in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of [...] was aborted because of a door lock problem. B. [...] Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of [...] and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. [...] had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. Survei...