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CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - Early 1971

14 January 1971 Bross said that he and Bronson Tweedy will have lunch today with General Bennett, Director of DIA. The Director said that he might ask Bross to take along a copy of his letter and guidance on the Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements but that he first wishes to clarify with the Executive Director some of the language in the guidance section. 18 January 1971 Maury said that he anticipates a number of questions from the Hill on the attached article by Jack Anderson in today's Washington Post , "6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA." Houston related that he will have lunch today with Assistant General Robert C. Mardian to discuss the Director's guidelines on the disclosure of classified information. Bross related that Parrott met with General Bennett to review the Director's letter on disclosure of classified information and said that General Bennett will now discuss it with Deputy Secretary Packa...

Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aicraft and Other Attacks

Declassified and Approved For Release, 12 July 2004 4 December 1998 SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks Reporting [...] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq 'Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama' at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation was on hold. A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options--perhaps including an aircraft hijacking. IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the "next couple of weeks" to free 'Abd al-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source. The same source late last month said ...

Afghanistan: Is Ethnic Cleansing in Its Future?

South Asia Notes December 1996 - Issue 34 Although the scale of brutalities in Afghanistan's civil war is not comparable to the ethnic cleansing that has occurred in states of the former Yugoslavia, both war-torn regions share disturbing characteristics, including: Intermingled settlement patterns. Most Afghan ethnic groups inhabit core areas where they form local majorities, although settlement patterns are rarely well defined ( see map ). For instance, ethnic enclaves--some with substantial populations--exist in most Afghan provinces. Complicating matters, some ethnic groups--Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Baloch, for instance--comprise tiny minorities within Afghanistan but maintain ties to much larger population of ethnic kinsmen across Afghanistan's national borders. Ethnic rivalries thus have no real internal or international boundaries. Refugees. Some 2.3 million Afghans drawn from most every ethnic community still languish in Pakistani and Iranian refugee camps. The picture is ...

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - Late 1970

9 July 1970 The Director advised the DD/I that White House staffer Houston and Presidential Counsellor Pat Moynihan thought well of the memorandum on "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean." 10 July 1970 Maury briefed on his meeting yesterday with Congressman Richard Ichord, Chairman of the House Internal Security Committee, who had asked what we are doing to investigate "security leaks" connected with press accounts of Lon Nol's having sold rice to the Communists and having engaged in an attempted deal with Hanoi. Maury briefed on his explanation of why we are doing nothing, since such reports are not exclusively confined to our information. 1 September 1970 Maury noted that the Director sent a letter to Congressman Moss on telephone monitoring practices. 3 September 1970 The Director noted a 1 September memorandum from John Bross on Daniel Ellsberg. He asked the DDS to lift his clearances and to make this fact known in security channels. 15 October 1970 DDS report...

4. Conclusions

If the UNGA accepts partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem, it is almost certain that armed hostilities will result in Palestine; that the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world will be seriously disturbed; and that US commercial and strategic interests in the Near East will be dangerously jeopardized. Although the UNGA Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is now considering establishing a Commission responsible to the Security Council to oversee the implementation of partition. it is unlikely that any sizable international police force will initially be available to the Commission. It is highly probable, therefore, that Jewish and Arab forces will clash over the attempt of the Jews to establish a Jewish state. Into this struggle between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the people of the Arab states will inevitably be drawn. Although most of the Arab governments will be reluctant to act in opposition to a UNGA decision and against the wishes of the major ...

Telecon this morning concerning any OSA activities which could put the Agency into an embarrassing situation.

7 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology 1. There are no missions which we have flown during the last four years with which I can associate the result directly to any activity potentially embarrassing to the Agency. There were a number of missions flown that indirectly have the potential for this embarrassment. Bear in mind that once we turn the film over to NPIC or any other agency, we have no control over subsequent distribution. 2. The missions listed on the attachment are in three categories: a. Category A: These are missions flown in the U.S. that are very similar to the potential that you discussed with me using the example of the Santa Barbara oil disaster. b. Category B: The [...] (detection of illicit poppy grove) is a separate category because of the high sensitivity of this subject. c. Category C: When we were developing LONG SHAFT, the [...] In effect, we were [...] Although to our knowledge nothing sensitive was picked up, in the broad sense th...

3. Military Consequences

a. The Arab Forces. (1) Character. The bulk of the Arab forces fighting the Zionists will be semi-trained guerrilla groups and loosely organized tribesmen. There are three main sources from which the Arabs can raise men to light in Palestine; (1) Arab quasi-military organizations led by ex-army officers, which will form the core of the guerrillas; (2) soldiers volunteering from the official armies of the Arab states to participate in action against the Jews; and (3) tribesmen, who will probably be the largest source. (2) Strength. It is estimated that the largest number of Arabs actively engaged against the Zionists at any one time will be between 100,000 and 200,000, including Palestine Arabs, volunteers, Beduin, and quasi-military organizations from the other Arab states. The armed strength of the Arabs in Palestine itself is estimated at 33,000, most of wham are members of such quasi-military organizations as the Futuwwa. the Najjada, the Arab Youth Organization, and the Ikhwan (Mos...