Secrets of the CIA

OCI produced in December 1967 at Walt Rostow's request a 30-page typescript study of the SDS and its foreign ties. In the summer of 1968 OCI produced--again at Rostow's request--a paper on Restless Youth . The first, and most sensitive section, was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. It drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on SDS and affiliated groups. The second section comprised 19 chapters on foreign student dissidence. Black radicalism OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. Two papers were produced on the subject, one in August 1969 and the other in June 1970. OCI was asked in June 1970 to write a memo with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The memo was produced in typescript and given to the DCI. OCI in 1968 wrote periodic typescript memos on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dr

6 JUN 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services FROM: Director of Security 1. This memorandum is for information only. 2. In July 1971, the New York Times featured an article under the by-line of William Beecher which contained an exposition of the then current status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It was evident from this delineation of these talks that William Beecher had obtained the information from highly classified U.S. Government documents or from a person or persons having had access to such documents. 3. In this regard, Mr. Egil E. Krogh, Jr of the White House telephonically contacted the Director of Security of this Agency and requested that this Agency provide a polygraph examiner to conduct polygraph tests on four Department of State employees. In conjunction with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, this Office arranged for a polygraph examiner to conduct these examinations but with no

30 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby I call to your attention the attached sensitive annexes to our 1972 report of survey of EUR Division. You have seen them before, but a fresh look at them might be in order in the light of current developments. [...] The recent revelations about the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee are getting close to our MHCHAOS program. We are particularly concerned about MHCHAOS because of the high degree of resentment we found among many Agency employees at their being expected to participate in it. William V. Broe Inspector General Attachments TS 185228/72/2, 9 Nov 72 TS 185228/72/3, 9 Nov 72

25 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 1. A memorandum for the record by the Executive Officer of the Office of Logistics points out that this Agency is disposing of classified trash for the NSC. The material contains documents from the White House "Situation Room," codeword and other documents from the intelligence community. This practice began in December 1971 and is still in effect. Pick-up of 30 bags of trash is made each Thursday. 2. Under normal times and circumstances such a routine matter would not be raised, but given the recent furor caused by the destruction of documents by the Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray it is felt that the matter should at least be highlighted for further consideration.

29 MAY 1973 By MICHAEL C. JENSEN One unsolved puzzle that Watergate investigators are studying is the identity of intruders who broke into the offices and residences of Chilean diplomats in Washington and New York at least four times from April, 1971 to May, 1972. Four break-ins against Chileans took place in the 14 months immediately preceding the break-in at the Democrats' Watergate headquarters last June. They also occurred at a time when the Chilean Government was negotiating with the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation over compensation for Chile's takeover of the huge conglomerate's telephone subsidiary. Because of far more sensational disclosures, Watergate investigators have not actively pursued the Chilean case in recent weeks, beyond asking a question or two about the break-ins during interrogations of the Watergate burglars. However, Senate investigators have informed both the Senate Watergate committee and the Watergate prosecutors in Washington ab

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY STATE MESSAGE 306383 PAGE 01-01 NC 02776 TOR:111326Z JUN 73 RUEAIIB R UUUUUU EOC STATE ZZH RUESVA RULPALJ RUEHC #2189 1621322 R UUUUU ZZH 111312Z JUN 73 SECSTATE WASHDC RUESVA/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 2592 FO PULPALJ/PANCANAL IMMEDIATE LPAC/USSOUTHCOM IMMEDIATE CLAS STATE 112189 0. 11652: N/A GS: PFOR, PN SUBJECT: ALLEGATIONS MADE BY JOHN DEAN TO NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE THE FOLLOWING IS EXCERPTED FROM A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE FROM TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES WHICH REPORTS ON ALLEGIATIONS MADE BY JOHN DEAN TO NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE. "SOME "LOW-LEVEL" WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS CONSIDERED ASSASSINATING PANAMA'S RULER OMAR TORRIJOS, BECAUSE THEY SUSPECTED THE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGH PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES IN HEROIN TRAFFIC AND BECAUSE THEY FELT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE ABOUT RENEGOTIATING THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY. E. HOWARD HUNT JR., A LEADER OF THE WATERGATE BURGLARS, HAD A TEAM IN MEXICO "BEFORE THE MISSION WAS ABORTED," NEWSWEEK SAID."

The Central Intelligence Agency for all of its history has remained an instrument of the Executive Branch (i.e., the President of the United States). Its mandate is to implement policy, not to formulate it. Details of CIA covert actions are usually decided through the President's National Security Council, the current structure of which is as follows: Chair Barack Obama (President of the United States) Statutory Attendees Joe Biden (Vice President of the United States) Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State) Robert M. Gates (Secretary of Defense) Military Advisor ADM Michael Mullen (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Intelligence Advisor Dennis C. Blair (Director of National Intelligence) Regular Attendees James L. Jones (National Security Advisor) Rahm Emanuel (Chief of Staff to the President) Thomas E. Donilon (Deputy National Security Advisor) Howard Schmidt (White House Cybersecurity Coordinator) Additional Participants Tim Geithner (Secretary of the Treasury) Eric Holde

SECRET 20 June 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 1. Mr. William Jorden, the Latin American referent on Dr. Kissinger's Staff, called today in reference to State cable No. 112189, dated 11 June (attached). He said that he had specific reference to paragraph 2 of that cable and would like to have "everything and anything we know" on that subject in the Agency. 2. The undersigned indicated to Mr. Jorden that he had checked out the allegation that some low level White House officials had considered assassinating Torrijos when the story first appeared in Newsweek and despite checking outside WH Division also, could find no one in the Agency who could recollect or find anything relating to such a plan on the part of any portion of U.S. officialdom. I told him that I felt sure that nothing of this nature had come to WH Division's attention because for the period in question I had been Deputy Chief of WH Division and had heard nothing about any such plan. Mr. Jorden asked if th

CONFIDENTIAL 18 JUN 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General REFERENCE: Memo dtd 30 May 73 to DTR fm [...] Subj: Issuance of Disguise Materials for Probably Use Within U.S. or Its Territories 1. The Associate Deputy Director for Operations has asked that we give you a detailed report of the actual use that the Office of Training has made within the U.S. of all disguise materials and alias documentation we have obtained for our staff members and students. 2. Disguise Materials OTR has obtained from OTS disguise materials - including glasses, wigs, mustaches, and special shoes to increase height - for 12 staff instructors at the Domestic Training Station. The purpose of these materials is to increase the difficulty that students in the Basic Operations Course and Advanced Operations Course will have in recognizing instructors during problems and exercises conducted [...] near DTS. Exercises include surveillance, countersurveillance, brush passes, and dead drop problems in which instructors

1 March 1973 Maury related that former Director Richard Helms has been asked by Senator Fulbright to reappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Maury said that Mr. Helms would probably be queried on the Watergate incident, Agency training of police, and ITT and went on to describe Mr. Helms' anticipated response. Maury reported that Congressman Holifield's staff is anxiously awaiting a letter from the Director in response to the Congressman's written inquiry on police training. The Director noted plans to forward it. 2 March 1973 Maury highlighted yesterday's LIG meeting at the White House and his recommendation that we not provide examples of Congressional leaks of classified information for White House use in reacting to Congressional criticism of the Administration's "indiscretions." The DDS advised that the Office of Security is keeping a reasonably complete record of obvious leaks of intelligence information in the press and elsewhere. 5

7 February 1973 Maury noted that Mr. Helms is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning on police training, ITT, and the Watergate incident. He also noted that he has solicited the support of Senators Humphrey, McGee, and Scott to make appropriate public statements following Mr. Helms' appearance. Mary advised that in response to Chairman Holifield's investigation of Agency training of policemen, he will meet with Herbert Roback, Counsel of the House Government Operations Committee, to explain our briefing of various police departments. 8 February 1973 The Director noted his scheduled meeting tomorrow with Defense Secretary Richardson and asked Executive Committee members to give him a note on any item they wish him to raise with the Secretary. Candidates are . . . Secretary Richardson's earlier concerns with respect to HEW providing the Agency with travel plans of officers going to Communist Bloc countries. On the latter item the DDI explained th

10 January 1973 Maury related that we will be on firm ground in responding to Congressman Koch if we indicate that our assistance to the NY City Police Dept. was not training but a briefing on an essentially unclassified basis undertaken in response to the suggestion of a consultant to the N.Y.P.D. Thuermer reminded those concerned that [...] is a former Agency employee. 12 January 1973 [redacted] 15 January 1973 Maury noted press stories that Watergate defendant Martinez was on the Agency pay roll until 17 June and anticipated some inquiry on this topic. The DDP endorsed his view that whereas Martinez was intermittently used as a source to report on Cuban exile matters, this relationship should cause no serious difficulty. 17 January 1973 The Director called attention to the article by James Reston "The Watergate Spies" contained in the New York Times , and wondered how Reston got the erroneous impression that Hunt was " . . . Operational head of the CIA's Cuban Bay

12 December 1972 Thuermer noted an inquiry from Dave Burnham of the New York Times, who appears to be writing a story on the twelve New York Police officers who were briefed by the Agency on information processing. A brief discussion followed, and Thuermer will advise Burnham that we have occasionally provided briefings at the request of various police organizations, but these are exceptional cases. 13 December 1972 The Director noted the article by Thomas B. Ross in yesterday's Evening Star-News, "New Watergate Dimension?" and the impression left therein that the Agency was involved in the Watergate incident because a passport bearing the name Edward Hamilton was found on Frank Sturgis. Any inquiries from the press or elsewhere are to be met with a "this is nonsense" reply. The Executive Director noted work underway to identify the genesis of the passport story. 29 December 1972 Unumb reported that Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, who is preparing a story o

18 October 1972 Maury noted his response to a request from CSC General Counsel Anthony Mondello, who was reacting to a request for the personnel files of those former Agency officers involved in the Watergate incident from Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures. He added that we are exempted from related CSC regulations, and the Director endorsed his plan to provide only the dates of their departure from the Agency in the event the Senator's office calls us on this matter. 3 November 1972 Houston recalled that last August he reported on a call from Howard Hunt and his subsequent guidance to [...] on how to handle affiliation with the Agency, [...] The Director highlighted his conversation with David Kraslow of the Washington Star News and his flat denial of a proposed story that the Agency was asked to report on the Democratic Party which led to the Watergate incident and others. The Director noted his plans to issue a statement of denial if s

There is no single answer to this question and the CIA has been known to employ any number of regular pistols. However, in 1975, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby showed Congress an electric pistol that was specifically designed for the CIA. It used a poison dart that was intended to disintegrate upon contact with a body and not leave a trace as to the source beyond a small mark on human flesh. Remarking on the Colt .45, TIME magazine reported "the gun fires a toxin-tipped dart, almost silently and accurately up to 250 ft. Moreover, the dart is so tiny--the width of a human hair and a quarter of an inch long--as to be almost undetectable, and the poison leaves no trace in a victim's body." Committee chairman Frank Church remarked that it was an efficient method for killing people, to which Colby replied, "It is a very serious weapon."

14 September 1972 Maury reported on his conversation with Messrs. Flug and Epstein of Senator Kennedy's staff in response to the Senator's 18 August letter to the Director alleging improper contact [...] (for details see OLC's Memorandum for the Record). Thuermer noted that White House staffer David Young will hold a meeting today to brief the press on the implementation of Executive Order 11652. 21 September 1972 Warner reported that Marchetti's lawyers have been in touch with Justice in connection with ACLU's filing a secret brief with the Supreme Court and said that the Office of Security will pick it up as a convenience to Justice. Warner noted that the Director is one of several defendants in a civil case filed by Ellsberg and Russo. Unumb noted a request from the National Observer for biographic data on Howard Hunt and James McCord in connection with a story they are doing on the Watergate incident. The Director endorsed his having provided only the dates thes

1 August 1972 DDS related that Mr. [...] of the CI Staff received a call from the Secret Service requesting our training film on defensive driving. The Director interposed no objection to making this film available. 8 August 1972 Houston reported that Judge McArdle granted a motion for summary judgment in the Tofte case. 21 August 1972 Houston noted a telephone call from Howard Hunt who explained that his attorney was with him and had a question about a friend's past affiliation with the Agency. [...] DD/Sec, has reviewed the employment, and Houston reported that he replied directly to Hunt's friend, Mr. [...] that his old affiliation should create no problems in connection with his appearance before a grand jury. 22 August 1972 Thuermer reported on a call from a Mr. Crewdson of the New York Times who said he was "formally requesting" a photograph of Howard Hunt. The DDP observed that we are under no obligation to provide a photograph, and Thuermer said he had decline

5 July 1972 Houston called attention to the judge's ruling in the Ellsberg/Russo case denying the defense motion for an evidentiary hearing, as a result of which the subpoena directed at CIA is suspended. 11 July 1972 DDI noted press attention attached to Secretary of Commerce Peterson's planned trip to the Soviet Union and observed that [...] It was also noted that [...] a secretary assigned to Peterson's office when he was Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, continues to work for him and may go to the Soviet Union. She will be in a LWOP status during the remainder of her tenure with the Secretary. 14 July 1972 Carver recalled that we have provided some briefings to Senator Eagleton on Vietnam. The Director said that in time we will receive instructions from the White House on briefing Senators McGovern and Eagleton. 20 July 1972 Houston reported that the Justice Department is anxious that no comment be made on the Ellsberg/Russo trial and that a

6 June 1972 Thuermer explained that he will continue working with the General Counsel in response to Charles Nesson's efforts to serve a subpoena on him in connection with the Ellsberg case. He noted the related article by Robert A. Wright in today's New York Times, "Hearing Is Asked In Ellsberg Case." 7 June 1972 Houston noted a letter from the Justice Department conveying a subpoena directed to Angus Thuermer in connection with the Ellsberg case. He highlighted the schedule of documents requested, most of which were mentioned in footnotes to the Pentagon papers. He noted plans to ask Justice to declare the material irrelevant to the case. 8 June 1972 Houston said that he will be attending a meeting called by DOD General Counsel Buzhardt, who is recommending that Justice drop the case against Daniel Ellsberg. 19 June 1972 The Director noted the 17 June arrest of James W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at

1 May 1972 DDS related that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service to provide two technicians in support of the Vice President's trip to Tokyo. The Director concurred. 2 May 1972 DDS reported that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service for counteraudio technicians to support the President's trip to Moscow. The Director concurred. 11 May 1972 Houston noted his correspondence with White House staffer David Young pertaining to our problems with Executive Order 11652 and added that Mr. Young has accepted our position on about 90 percent of our problems with the implementing draft directive. 24 May 1972 Houston explained that he had obtained White House Staffer David Young's understanding that we will not meet the 1 June deadline for producing internal Agency regulations implementing the NSC directive on Executive Order 11652. A brief discussion followed on the cumbersome bookkeeping and declassification authoriti

2 March 1972 Houston reported that the draft Executive Order on classification has undergone a few minor changes. He noted Director's letter to John Ehrlichman, dated 7 December 1971, with respect to our position on problems related to declassification and suggested that a copy be provided David Young, NSC staffer. After a brief discussion, the Director interposed no objection. 6 March 1972 The Director noted his memorandum to the Deputies and Independent Office Heads, subject: "Allegations of Assassinations." He asked that it be mentioned at Staff Meetings. 21 March 1972 The Director said that the President has seen his 17 February memorandum on reducing disclosures of classified intelligence and directed the White House staff to prepare a memorandum urging that all agencies comply with proper disclosure procedures. 22 March 1972 Houston reported that he is scheduled to meet with John Ehrlichman this morning. 23 March 1972 Maury reported that, after checking with Egil Kr

3 February 1972 A/DDS reported the House Appropriations Committee request for a finance officer to assist them in work on the budget. He added that we have provided such assistance in the past, and the Director interposed no objection. 7 February 1972 Houston explained that no action will be taken in the near future with respect to the Hans Tofte case, since the judge has been stricken with hepatitis. 8 February 1972 DDI noted the article by Michael Getler in Today's Washington Post, "New Spy Satellites Planned for Clearer, Instant Pictures." Later in the meeting the Director asked the DDS to advise the Director of Security to undertake an investigation of this leak of EOI-related information and to convene the USIB Security Committee. 11 February 1972 Carver noted his handling of White House staffer Sven Kraemer's request to FBIS for material concerning U.S. POWs. The Director reminded Executive Committee members of Dr. Kissinger's request that any inquiries from

Documentary filmmaker Allan Francovich explains in this interview the type of people the CIA tends to recruit and expounds on the nature and overall ethic of the CIA. Allan Francovich (1941 - April 24, 1997) was an American film producer and director who made a series of films purporting to expose Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operations. Francovich suffered a heart attack while going through U.S. customs at Houston airport, Texas on April 17, 1997, and died at the age of 56.

7 January 1972 Maury said that according to Frank Slatinshek, Chairman Nedzi will rely on us rather heavily for support during his hearings on the problem of classification and handling of Government information (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 6 January 1972). The Director encouraged Maury to see Chairman Nedzi next week, and Houston suggested that the Chairman be provided with the Rehnquist study. DDP briefed on work under way to limit distribution of reports [...] and noted that C/FI is completing a review of steps which might be taken to restrict dissemination of sensitive reports from all sources. 11 January 1972 Maury related that Frank Slatinshek is pressing for background materials pertaining to past efforts or studies related to the classification and control of information. He added that he and Houston will meet with the Director later today to discuss the availability of the Rehnquist study. 12 January 1972 Maury briefed on his and Houston's session with Frank Slatinshek

6 August 1971 The Director called attention to the article by Michael Getler in today's Washington Post, "CIA Patrols Into China Said Halted," and directed (1) that Maury write a letter for his signature to Senator Stennis making it clear that Senator Case was briefed on this topic and obviously leaked it; (2) that Maury brief Carl March on the background, including the fact that these operations were not terminated because of the President's projected trip to Communist China but because certain aspects of them were previously exposed in the press; (3) that the Director of Security (who was present at the Morning Meeting) get additional background from Maury and see White House staffer David Young; (4) that Goodwin reply to queries by saying that we know nothing about this matter; (5) that Houston and Maury utilize this incident in any material prepared for his use in opposing the Cooper bill; and (6) that the DDCI brief Dr. Kissinger or General Haig on this matter to

1 July 1971 "Carver noted that Secretary Laird had requested that our printing plant assist in reproducing the forty-seven-volume secret Pentagon study on Vietnam for distribution to the press and others this morning. This request was aborted by the President." (DDCI in the chair) 2 July 1971 "DD/S said that in the absence of [...] attended a meeting at the White House yesterday of the interagency group which is reviewing classification and declassification policy. The President spent an hour with the group and said that he wants: ... and (6) the revocation of all clearances and the return of all classified material held at Harvard, Brookings, Rand, and Cal Tech, as well as the withdrawal of Q clearances held by the Regents of the University of California. A brief discussion followed, and the Executive Director noted that DOD has asked us to provide information on all our contracts with Rand, as well as all clearances held by Rand personnel for our purposes. Acting Direc

The Intelligence Reform Act provides that the DNI will assume responsibilities for managing the NIC. The DNI will be support by the NIC staff (probably numbering less than 100 positions). This gives the DNI the capability to oversee the preparation of NIEs and to ensure that the views of all agencies have been taken into consideration in interagency assessments. A major change will be the fact that the NIOs and their staff will work for one person (the DNI) while CIA analysts will report to a separate Director of the CIA. Congress may ultimately assess whether these changes, as they are implemented, have improved the efforts of the Intelligence Community and its analytical products. The future responsibility for the production and presentation of the PDB/SEIBs is uncertain. They are currently prepared by CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, and that responsibility could be continued. On the other hand, if the DNI, rather than the CIA Director, is to conduct the daily briefing for the Pre

Left uncertain are responsibilities for preparing the written brief on current intelligence that is prepared daily for the President and a very few other senior officials. The President’s Daily Brief (PDB), along with the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) that has a somewhat wider distribution, have been prepared by CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and are considered that directorate’s “flagship products.” Nonetheless, should the DNI be responsible for daily substantive briefings at the White House rather than the CIA Director, it might be considered appropriate that the DNI staff draft the PDB and the SEIB, based on input from the CIA and other agencies. The number of analysts who actually prepare the PBD/SEIB is not large, but their work reflects ongoing analysis in the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community. Some might argue, moreover, that close and important links between CIA desk-level analysts and the PDB would be jeopardized should the briefs be prepar

On many topics, there are inevitably different perspectives, and according to many observers, policymakers are best served by rigorous presentations of alternative positions.15 At the same time, however, some NIEs reflect an effort to craft language that all agencies can agree on and thus to avoid airing differences that might draw agencies into policy arguments between and among government departments. Agency managers understand that too close involvement in a policy argument by intelligence analysts can make their analyses unwelcome across the board. In addition, they well understand that analysis is an uncertain science and art and that even the best analysts can miss developments that loom large in retrospect and leave their agencies open to harsh criticism or retribution. Concern is often expressed about the extent to which intelligence products can become “politicized,” i.e., be drafted to support or undermine certain policy options. A charge of politicization is difficult to pro

John R. Stockwell explains in the video clips that follow. Stockwell, a former CIA case officer, became a critic of United States government policies after serving in the Agency for thirteen years serving seven tours of duty. After managing U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War as Chief of the Angola Task Force during its 1975 covert operations, he resigned and wrote In Search of Enemies , a book which remains the only detailed, insider's account of a major CIA "covert action."

The most recent chairman of the NIC is Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings, who had previously served in the State Department and in academic institutions.12 In addition, there are senior analysts, known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), for Africa, East Asia, Economics and Global Issues, Europe, Intelligence Assurance, Latin America, Military Issues, Near East and South Asia, Russia and Eurasia, Transnational Threats, Warning, and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation. The NIOs, who do not receive Senate confirmation, come from a variety of government agencies, inside and outside the Intelligence Community, and from the private sector. National Intelligence Officers supervise the production of NIEs and other community-wide products. Typically, an analyst in one agency is designated by the relevant NIO to prepare a draft analytical product; the draft then is reviewed by relevant analysts throughout the Community. Subsequently, if approved by the leadership of the Intelligenc

Under the new legislation, the Office of the DNI will include the National Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of senior analysts within the Intelligence Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector.8 The members of the NIC “shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers fo the Intelligence Community for purposes of representing the views of the [I]ntelligence [C]ommunity within the United States Government.” The members of the NIC are to be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of the DNI. The Intelligence Reform Act, provides that the DNI, when appointed, will be responsible for NIEs and other analytical products prepared under the auspices of the NIC. The three statutory responsibilities of the NIC have been to: - produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, included, whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community; - evaluate community-wide collection and production

The fundamental responsibility of intelligence services is to provide information to support policymakers and military commanders. In reviewing the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, concluded that greater coordination of the nation’s intelligence effort is required to enhance the collection and analysis of information. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new position of National Intelligence Director (NID) be established to ensure greater inter-agency coordination. A number of legislative proposals were introduced in 2004 to establish such an office separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).1 The NID was envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as having a number of budgetary and managerial responsibilities.2 In addition, the occupant of the position would “retain the present DCI’s role as the pr

In September 2006, President Bush publicly acknowledged the existence of a secret CIA program to detain international terror suspects worldwide. Earlier media reports alleged that Poland and Romania were among the countries that had hosted secret CIA prisons, although officials of both governments have denied these allegations. A European Parliament probe conducted throughout 2006 cited no clear proof of prison sites in Europe, but could not rule out the possibility that Romania had hosted detention operations by U.S. secret services. However, in June 2007 a Council of Europe report claimed to have evidence that U.S. detention facilities had been based in the two countries. President Kaczynski has stated that, since he assumed office, “there has been no secret prison — I am 100 percent sure of it,” and that he had been “assured there were never any in the past either.”17 Some Poles have argued that, despite the human casualties and financial costs their country has borne in Iraq and Af