Saturday, January 30, 2010

SDS and other student activist groups

OCI produced in December 1967 at Walt Rostow's request a 30-page typescript study of the SDS and its foreign ties.

In the summer of 1968 OCI produced--again at Rostow's request--a paper on Restless Youth. The first, and most sensitive section, was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. It drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on SDS and affiliated groups. The second section comprised 19 chapters on foreign student dissidence.

Black radicalism

OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. Two papers were produced on the subject, one in August 1969 and the other in June 1970.

OCI was asked in June 1970 to write a memo with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The memo was produced in typescript and given to the DCI.

OCI in 1968 wrote periodic typescript memos on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped from public view.

Friday, January 29, 2010

DD/M&S Requirements - Watergate Incident

6 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM: Director of Security

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. In July 1971, the New York Times featured an article under the by-line of William Beecher which contained an exposition of the then current status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It was evident from this delineation of these talks that William Beecher had obtained the information from highly classified U.S. Government documents or from a person or persons having had access to such documents.

3. In this regard, Mr. Egil E. Krogh, Jr of the White House telephonically contacted the Director of Security of this Agency and requested that this Agency provide a polygraph examiner to conduct polygraph tests on four Department of State employees. In conjunction with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, this Office arranged for a polygraph examiner to conduct these examinations but with no CIA involvement to be acknowledged. In other words, this Office loaned the polygraph examiner to the Department of State and the polygraph examinations were conducted for Mr. G. Marvin Gentile.

4. This Office in 1970, requested approval to have disguise kits issued to approximately fourteen people. The disguise kits were never issued for operational purposes, but they were issued for practice surveillance to train local field office personnel in their use, [...] Of these fourteen disguise kits, four were returned to the Office of Technical Services.

5. In regard to other activities that this Office has conducted domestically, the following two projects are submitted:

A. Project WESTPOINTER: In September 1969, February 1970, May 1970, and October 1971, a project, similar to Project SRPOINTER, was conducted by the Office of Security, East Asia Division, and the Office of Technical Services in the San Francisco, California, area. The target was mail to the United States from Mainland China.

B. [redacted]

6. [...] an Office of Security employee, who will retire effective 29 June 1973, had a chance meeting with Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. on 24 May 1973 near the Senate Office Building. According to Mr. [...] the substance of the chance meeting was an exchange of pleasantries.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Thursday, January 28, 2010


30 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

I call to your attention the attached sensitive annexes to our 1972 report of survey of EUR Division. You have seen them before, but a fresh look at them might be in order in the light of current developments. [...] The recent revelations about the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee are getting close to our MHCHAOS program. We are particularly concerned about MHCHAOS because of the high degree of resentment we found among many Agency employees at their being expected to participate in it.

William V. Broe
Inspector General

TS 185228/72/2, 9 Nov 72
TS 185228/72/3, 9 Nov 72

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Disposal of Classified Trash for the National Security Council (NSC)

25 May 1973


1. A memorandum for the record by the Executive Officer of the Office of Logistics points out that this Agency is disposing of classified trash for the NSC. The material contains documents from the White House "Situation Room," codeword and other documents from the intelligence community. This practice began in December 1971 and is still in effect. Pick-up of 30 bags of trash is made each Thursday.

2. Under normal times and circumstances such a routine matter would not be raised, but given the recent furor caused by the destruction of documents by the Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray it is felt that the matter should at least be highlighted for further consideration.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Chilean Break-Ins Puzzle Watergate Investigators

29 MAY 1973


One unsolved puzzle that Watergate investigators are studying is the identity of intruders who broke into the offices and residences of Chilean diplomats in Washington and New York at least four times from April, 1971 to May, 1972.

Four break-ins against Chileans took place in the 14 months immediately preceding the break-in at the Democrats' Watergate headquarters last June. They also occurred at a time when the Chilean Government was negotiating with the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation over compensation for Chile's takeover of the huge conglomerate's telephone subsidiary.

Because of far more sensational disclosures, Watergate investigators have not actively pursued the Chilean case in recent weeks, beyond asking a question or two about the break-ins during interrogations of the Watergate burglars.

However, Senate investigators have informed both the Senate Watergate committee and the Watergate prosecutors in Washington about the details of the four break-ins at the offices and residences of the Chileans.

3 Occurred in New York

Furthermore, a member of the special intelligence unit of the New York Police Department was said to have concluded that the three break-ins that occurred in Manhattan were no routine burglaries. And investigators in Washington said that the four break-ins had followed similar patterns.

They were apparently done by professionals, with a few items taken to make the break-ins appear to be burglaries, investigators said. Other valuable items were left behind, however, and sensitive papers were disturbed, possibly in the course of being photographed. Investigators reconstruct the break-ins as follows:

Then first known break-in occurred on the afternoon of April 5, 1971 at the Manhattan residence on Lexington Avenue of Humberto Diaz-Casanueva, Chile's Ambassador to the United Nations. The Ambassador reportedly told the police that the intruders had stolen such items as a hair-dryer and a pair of boots.

The next break-in was said to have taken place six days later at the East 38th Street apartment in Manhattan of Javier Urrutia, president of the Chilean Development Corporation and a close economic adviser to Chile's president, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens.

Pistol Stolen

Mr. Urrutia told the police that a .25-caliber Bernardelli pistol had been stolen. However, a fur coat in a closet was reportedly untouched. Government papers were said to have been disturbed, and chewing gum was edged into the apartment's lock, a familiar practice of professional intruders that gives them time to escape if they are surprised during the course of an entry.

The third reported break-in took place on Feb. 10, 1972, investigators said, at the New York residence on East 46th Street of Victor Rioseco, formerly a Chilean official at the United Nations. A radio and a television set were reportedly taken and papers disturbed.

The fourth and most publicized break-in took place over the weekend of May 13, 1972, at the Chilean Embassy in Washington. Files of the Ambassador and his first secretary, Fernando Bachelet, were reportedly rifled and two radios taken.

Chilean officials have been ordered by their Government not to discuss the matter, but sources close to the case said that the former Chilean Ambassador, Orlando Letelier, had confirmed that the Washington intruders apparently were seeking sensitive Government documents.

Speculation by Investigators

Capitol Hill investigators have speculated that the intruders might have been seeking evidence of links between Cuba and Chile, or looking for politically sensitive documents relating to the take-over by Chile of I.T.T. properties.

No evidence has turned up that members of the team that broke into the Watergate were involved in the entries, although hints that some of them may have participated have come from the authorities in Florida.

First reports about a break-in at the Chilean Embassy began to circulate in Miami a week or so after the Watergate break-in of June 17, 1972, and there was speculation that the two might have been related. That link never has been proved, and some investigators doubt that it exists.

One explanation offered for the Chilean break-in was that if any Cuban-Americans participated, as was the case in the Watergate, they might have been looking for documents that would indicate collusion between the Chilean and Castro governments.

Shortly after the speculation began in Miami, Chilean officials acknowledged the break-in and reported it to the city police, who started an investigation that has been inconclusive.

Earlier this month, a Cuban named Felipe de Diego was interrogated by State Attorney Richard E. Gerstein in Florida regarding participation in the break-in at the offices of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Los Angeles.

He and his attorney indicated that, if granted immunity, Mr. de Diego might shed new light on other surreptitious operations in Washington. Investigators in Miami later indicated that these operations might include the Chilean break-in or break-ins.

Monday, January 25, 2010

Allegations Made by John Dean to Newsweek Magazine



306383 PAGE 01-01 NC 02776

TOR:111326Z JUN 73

RUEHC #2189 1621322
111312Z JUN 73


0. 11652: N/A



DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO: Dept. of State Refer to State

Who Does the CIA Report To / Work For / Answer To?

The Central Intelligence Agency for all of its history has remained an instrument of the Executive Branch (i.e., the President of the United States). Its mandate is to implement policy, not to formulate it. Details of CIA covert actions are usually decided through the President's National Security Council, the current structure of which is as follows:

Chair Barack Obama (President of the United States)
Statutory Attendees Joe Biden (Vice President of the United States)
Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State)
Robert M. Gates (Secretary of Defense)
Military Advisor ADM Michael Mullen (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Intelligence Advisor Dennis C. Blair (Director of National Intelligence)
Regular Attendees James L. Jones (National Security Advisor)
Rahm Emanuel (Chief of Staff to the President)
Thomas E. Donilon (Deputy National Security Advisor)
Howard Schmidt (White House Cybersecurity Coordinator)
Additional Participants Tim Geithner (Secretary of the Treasury)
Eric Holder (Attorney General)
Janet Napolitano (Secretary of Homeland Security)
Greg Craig (Counsel to the President)
Lawrence Summers (Assistant to the President for Economic Policy)
Susan Rice (Ambassador to the United Nations)
Peter Orzag (Director of Office of Management and Budget)

With this structure in place, CIA actions are almost always the direct result of presidential orders. Thus, it can be said that the phrase "the CIA did the following action" is shorthand for "the President ordered the CIA to carry out this action." The main purpose for the CIA's existence on the covert action side is the plausible deniability it provides the President (i.e. the U.S. government can deny any action took place, since the CIA's actions are secret) and that CIA actions are subject to minimal (and usually retroactive) oversight from Congress, giving the President nearly free rein to implement any number of covert actions in countries across the globe.

CIA insiders briefly explain the CIA's role in foreign policy in the film clip below:

Sunday, January 24, 2010

John Dean Allegations to Newsweek Magazine


20 June 1973


1. Mr. William Jorden, the Latin American referent on Dr. Kissinger's Staff, called today in reference to State cable No. 112189, dated 11 June (attached). He said that he had specific reference to paragraph 2 of that cable and would like to have "everything and anything we know" on that subject in the Agency.

2. The undersigned indicated to Mr. Jorden that he had checked out the allegation that some low level White House officials had considered assassinating Torrijos when the story first appeared in Newsweek and despite checking outside WH Division also, could find no one in the Agency who could recollect or find anything relating to such a plan on the part of any portion of U.S. officialdom. I told him that I felt sure that nothing of this nature had come to WH Division's attention because for the period in question I had been Deputy Chief of WH Division and had heard nothing about any such plan. Mr. Jorden asked if the Agency knew anything about Howard Hunt having had a team in Mexico "before the mission was aborted" and I indicated that as far as I knew, the Agency had no information on Hunt being in Mexico on such a mission. I also indicated, however, they could have been and the Agency might well not know it simply because he could have used an alias and he is an American citizen, which is outside the Agency's province and really the FBI's business. I suggested that it might be best if he checked the FBI on that particular angle. Subsequently I checked with Mr. William V. Broe, the IG, and Mr. John Horton, recently returned [...] and both indicated that they had not run across any information concerning this latter allegation of Hunt and a team in Mexico on a mission related to Panama.

3. It was apparent that Mr. Jorden was under some pressure to refute these allegations and was casting about in all directions to make as certain of his ground as he possibly could before he tried to do so.

Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

As Stated Above

Saturday, January 23, 2010

Use of Disguise Materials and Alias Documentation Within the U.S.


18 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 30 May 73 to DTR fm [...] Subj: Issuance of Disguise Materials for Probably Use Within U.S. or Its Territories

1. The Associate Deputy Director for Operations has asked that we give you a detailed report of the actual use that the Office of Training has made within the U.S. of all disguise materials and alias documentation we have obtained for our staff members and students.

2. Disguise Materials

OTR has obtained from OTS disguise materials - including glasses, wigs, mustaches, and special shoes to increase height - for 12 staff instructors at the Domestic Training Station. The purpose of these materials is to increase the difficulty that students in the Basic Operations Course and Advanced Operations Course will have in recognizing instructors during problems and exercises conducted [...] near DTS. Exercises include surveillance, countersurveillance, brush passes, and dead drop problems in which instructors monitor student activity. These exercises are run under carefully controlled conditions only in areas where adequate liaison exists with local authorities to avoid any flap should difficulty arise during an exercise.


The sole use of disguise materials by these instructors has been or will be in support of the training exercise noted above. At no time have the materials been used for other purposes.

3. Alias Documents

U.S. alias documents consisting primarily of business and social cards, but also including drivers' licenses and social security cards, have been used for more than a year by students [...] Such use is limited to establishing bona fides, if required, during the human assessment problem that is a part of the comprehensive exercise, [...] At the conclusion of the course, the alias documents are collected from the students and returned to OTS. Again, these documents are used only under carefully controlled conditions in an environment [...] where adequate liaison with local authorities exists to contain any flap; and the documents are used only for the purposes stated.

4. A thorough canvass of all elements of OTR discloses no other instance in recent years in which we have used disguise materials or alias documentation within the U.S. or obtained such materials for that purpose.

Director of Training

cc: ADDO

Friday, January 22, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - March 1973

1 March 1973
Maury related that former Director Richard Helms has been asked by Senator Fulbright to reappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Maury said that Mr. Helms would probably be queried on the Watergate incident, Agency training of police, and ITT and went on to describe Mr. Helms' anticipated response.

Maury reported that Congressman Holifield's staff is anxiously awaiting a letter from the Director in response to the Congressman's written inquiry on police training. The Director noted plans to forward it.

2 March 1973
Maury highlighted yesterday's LIG meeting at the White House and his recommendation that we not provide examples of Congressional leaks of classified information for White House use in reacting to Congressional criticism of the Administration's "indiscretions." The DDS advised that the Office of Security is keeping a reasonably complete record of obvious leaks of intelligence information in the press and elsewhere.

5 March 1973
Maury highlighted the statement Congressman Holifield will introduce into the Congressional Record today on Agency briefing of U.S. police forces. He also noted a related news release that will be issued by the Congressman's office.

6 March 1973
Maury highlighted Congressman Koch's reaction to our response to Congressman Holifield's letter concerning police training, as reported in today's press. Maury noted that Congressman Koch plans to ask GAO for a ruling on this matter, and the Director suggested that Colby provide some guidance to Comptroller General Elmer Staats.

The Director noted advice that Hugh Sidey of Time magazine plans to write a story alleging that Howard Hunt was employed by a cover organization, i.e., Robert R. Mullen Company, when he left the Agency. Colby noted that this company is a completely private concern but has provided cover for one or two officers overseas. The Director asked Thuermer to be prepared to cope with any inquiries when the story appears.

9 March 1973
DDI called attention to Joseph Alsop's article in today's Washington Post, "Analyzing the CIA's Analysts," which erroneously refers to Sam Adams as a former employee. Later in the meeting, Houston explained why the allegation that the Agency has tried to muzzle Adams is false. He went on to brief on [...] communications with Justice and the fact that the judge ruled Adams' material was not exculpatory. In response to the Director's question, the DDI reported that Mr. Adams has not been placed on probation. The Director found this unsatisfactory.

Houston explained the legal implications of the subpoena served on Thuermer for documents related to the Ellsberg case and advised that the Director may have to claim executive privilege.

15 March 1973
Houston said that the judge squashed the subpoena served on Thuermer (see Morning Minutes of 7 March).

Included in this folder are miscellaneous items, including the following:

Chuck Briggs' submission, including support of the Committee on narcotics

Review of Minutes of Morning Meetings


Agency funding of heroin study


Tom Parrott's involvement with David Young

Cary's memo on briefing of Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Of House Armed Services Committee (this relates to the McCord letters to the Agency)

Broe's report of his and Colby's meeting with Nedzi

Thursday, January 21, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - February 1973

7 February 1973

Maury noted that Mr. Helms is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning on police training, ITT, and the Watergate incident. He also noted that he has solicited the support of Senators Humphrey, McGee, and Scott to make appropriate public statements following Mr. Helms' appearance.

Mary advised that in response to Chairman Holifield's investigation of Agency training of policemen, he will meet with Herbert Roback, Counsel of the House Government Operations Committee, to explain our briefing of various police departments.

8 February 1973
The Director noted his scheduled meeting tomorrow with Defense Secretary Richardson and asked Executive Committee members to give him a note on any item they wish him to raise with the Secretary. Candidates are . . . Secretary Richardson's earlier concerns with respect to HEW providing the Agency with travel plans of officers going to Communist Bloc countries. On the latter item the DDI explained that since Secretary Richardson's inquiry to Mr. Helms (see minutes of 23 Jan 73), a survey had been undertaken and reviewed with HEW, which had no problems with these old arrangements but is shifting the point of pickup to its public affairs staff where such information is available to anyone.

Maury noted the statement by Senator Fulbright following Mr. Helms' appearance yesterday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which the Senator expressed his opposition to the whole concept of the Agency getting involved with the police even in an innocuous way. Maury added that he will see Chairman Holifield's staff assistance Herbert Roback today. Maury said that a statement had been transmitted to the White House yesterday for John Ehrlichman's possible use (attached). The Director asked that a contingency document be prepared along the lines that we will continue to comply with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which approves of our assistance to various police forces when authorized by the Justice Department. In response to the DDI's suggestions, the DDS will review what assistance to police forces had been given prior to 1968 and advise.

Maury concurred in the Director's judgment that it is impossible to keep all congressional elements happy and that we face a period of increased criticism from this quarter which must be met with firm assurances that what we are being criticized for is fully authorized and justified. Unless the facts justify such a statement, we would be well advised to terminate the activity in question.

Maury recalled that we are obligated to sit down with Chairman Nedzi and review what we do and don't do in the U.S. (see Morning Minutes of 18 and 19 January). The Director concurred. The DDI suggested that we undertake an in-house review of what it is we are doing within the U.S. and identify and eliminate the marginal.

9 February 1973
Maury said he spent an hour yesterday with Congressman Holifield and they decided to have their respective staffs work on a letter for Holifield to send to the Director suggesting restrictive, but not prohibitive, guidelines regarding such activities in the future. Maury noted Chairman Nedzi's current concerns about this topic and said the proposed letter may satisfy his worries.

14 February 1973
Thuermer noted advice from Nicholas Horrock of Newsweek that a "soft story" is floating around Newsweek on the general topic of political espionage and ex-CIA agents. Mr. Horrock asked what constraints we have on former employees. A lengthy discussion followed, noting in particular that the only legal constraint imposed is the terminal secrecy agreement as reinforced by the courts in the Marchetti case. Other than this, there are no constraints except moral ones. Thuermer will advise Horrock that thousands of employees have gone through CIA, and it is a matter of considerable pride that only a handful have deported themselves improperly.

15 February 1973
. . . . . Maury added that he went over (with Nedzi) Seymour Hersh's charges with respect to the Agency and our position on each. DDI recalled our obligation to brief Chairman Nedzi on Agency activities in the US.

20 February 1973
Maury related that Herb Roback of Senator Holifield's staff is being asked by David Burnham of the New York Times for the names of those city police departments we have briefed in the past. The DDS called attention to our obligation to clear with these police departments any mention of their having been briefed. In response to the Director's suggestion that the Agency issue a press release on this topic, a lengthy discussion followed and the Director asked the DDS to report to him on what our understanding with various police departments has been prior to our agreement to brief same. He also asked that editorial comment on any past Agency briefing of the press or press releases be assembled and explained that in principle we should from time to time make it known that we are part of the U.S. Government.

23 February 1973
Maury noted that Herb Roback of Senator Holifield's staff and Chairman Nedzi have concurred in a letter for the Director's signature which will indicate that we will undertake training of U.S. police "only for the most compelling reasons." A brief discussion followed and the Director observed that it is important for us to decide what we do and then advise the Hill accordingly.

27 February 1973
The Director noted a call from Senator Jackson, who asked him to meet with Senator McClellan sometime next week with regard to Congressman Holifield's inquiry concerning Agency training of U.S. police departments.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - January 1973

10 January 1973
Maury related that we will be on firm ground in responding to Congressman Koch if we indicate that our assistance to the NY City Police Dept. was not training but a briefing on an essentially unclassified basis undertaken in response to the suggestion of a consultant to the N.Y.P.D. Thuermer reminded those concerned that [...] is a former Agency employee.

12 January 1973

15 January 1973
Maury noted press stories that Watergate defendant Martinez was on the Agency pay roll until 17 June and anticipated some inquiry on this topic. The DDP endorsed his view that whereas Martinez was intermittently used as a source to report on Cuban exile matters, this relationship should cause no serious difficulty.

17 January 1973
The Director called attention to the article by James Reston "The Watergate Spies" contained in the New York Times, and wondered how Reston got the erroneous impression that Hunt was " . . . Operational head of the CIA's Cuban Bay of Pigs . . ."

18 January 1973
Maury reported that when he and Dave Blee, Chief/SB, saw Chairman Nedzi with respect to the Chairman's forthcoming trip to Finland, Leningrad, Sofia and Athens, Chairman Nedzi briefed on his November conversation with New York Times correspondent Seymour Hersh. Maury went on to highlight the several topics and allegations Hersh claims he has with respect to Agency activities, particularly allegations that we are engaged in extensive domestic operations. Maury will circulate a memorandum on the information Hersh claims he has. The Director explained that we should assemble a senior team to meet with Chairman Nedzi and clearly outline what we do and do not do in the United States. The Executive Director called attention to his 29 February 1972 memorandum to the deputies, Subject: Allegations of Agency involvement in the US, and suggested that it might serve as an outline for material to be covered with Chairman Nedzi.

Maury noted that in response to Tom Korologis' (Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Senate)) request for materials on instances where classified information had been leaked to the press, he assembled a paper on this topic and provided it with a note than an examination of most leaks reveals that the White House and Executive Branch are the guilty parties.

19 January 1973
Maury reported that Chairman Nedzi would like the full Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations to hear a presentation by us on Agency activity in the United States sometime in mid-February. The Director noted that his decision of yesterday to turn out a senior team for this briefing stands.

22 January 1973
General Walters noted Howard Hunt's appearance on television last night. Thuermer will obtain a transcript of the program, and the Executive Director noted his concern over Hunt's suggestion that he is no longer bound by his secrecy agreement.

23 January 1973
Executive Director noted that the terminal secrecy agreement which Howard Hunt signed said that he will be acknowledged as an Agency employee. His assertion that he is not bound by the agreement because we did in fact acknowledge his employment here is therefore ill-advised.

The Director noted a call from Elliot Richardson asking about some information that Seymour Hersh has developed to the effect that HEW automatically provides the Agency with travel orders on its employees and that this agreement was made in Secretary Ribicoff's time. The DDI will determine what this is about and advise.

24 January 1973
Maury noted that he met with Congressman Koch on our minimal assistance in briefing the New York City police officers. The Congressman would like something in writing on this, which Maury will prepare and sign.

Thuermer noted advice from a former Agency employee that Seymour Hersh has been assigned full time to the Watergate story, but in the meantim, Mr. Hersh claims he has evidence of Agency interest in an arsenal in the Midwest, a map-making facility in Vermont, and in Camp Peary.

26 January 1973
The Director noted he has advised the Director of Training of Mrs. Lyndon Johnson's request for Marie Chiarodo to handle the large volume of mail she has received.

DDI reported that he has been unable to turn up any information which would lead Seymour Hersh to allege that we have a map-making facility in Vermont.

30 January 1973
Thuermer reported that the Virginia Gazette seems to be persisting in its efforts to embarrass Camp Peary and has been in touch with Victor Marchetti and Patrick McGarvey, who have tended to confirm allegations that the Phoenix program was supported by contract assassins.

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - December 1972

12 December 1972
Thuermer noted an inquiry from Dave Burnham of the New York Times, who appears to be writing a story on the twelve New York Police officers who were briefed by the Agency on information processing. A brief discussion followed, and Thuermer will advise Burnham that we have occasionally provided briefings at the request of various police organizations, but these are exceptional cases.

13 December 1972
The Director noted the article by Thomas B. Ross in yesterday's Evening Star-News, "New Watergate Dimension?" and the impression left therein that the Agency was involved in the Watergate incident because a passport bearing the name Edward Hamilton was found on Frank Sturgis. Any inquiries from the press or elsewhere are to be met with a "this is nonsense" reply. The Executive Director noted work underway to identify the genesis of the passport story.

29 December 1972
Unumb reported that Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, who is preparing a story on the Watergate incident, had asked if Martinez had been employed by the Agency. Acting DCI recommended that the Agency not assist Mr. Hersh's efforts.

Monday, January 18, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - October/November 1972

18 October 1972
Maury noted his response to a request from CSC General Counsel Anthony Mondello, who was reacting to a request for the personnel files of those former Agency officers involved in the Watergate incident from Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures. He added that we are exempted from related CSC regulations, and the Director endorsed his plan to provide only the dates of their departure from the Agency in the event the Senator's office calls us on this matter.

3 November 1972
Houston recalled that last August he reported on a call from Howard Hunt and his subsequent guidance to [...] on how to handle affiliation with the Agency, [...]

The Director highlighted his conversation with David Kraslow of the Washington Star News and his flat denial of a proposed story that the Agency was asked to report on the Democratic Party which led to the Watergate incident and others. The Director noted his plans to issue a statement of denial if such a story were to appear and suggested that Thuermer consider drafting one for contingency use.

15 November 1972
DDP noted a report from Chief, WH Division that on 9 October a Mr. Harper of the New York Times was working on a story which tries to link the Agency with Cuban emigres, the break-in at the Chilean Embassy, action against Daniel Ellsberg, and the Watergate case. Thuermer observed that this is the first he has heard about this topic, and the DDP concluded that such a story could have no basis in fact and it would be inadvisable to try to straighten out Mr. Harper.

20 November 1972
DD/I called attention to Jack Anderson's column in today's Washington Post and the quotes contained therein from an Agency report on a famous singer. The Director highlighted his brief conversation with Jack Anderson and explained that the Director of Security is looking into this matter.

22 November 1972
Warner related that according to Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert has several questions on the Watergate case. The Director indicates he will review this matter later.

What Gun/Pistol Does the CIA Use?

There is no single answer to this question and the CIA has been known to employ any number of regular pistols. However, in 1975, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby showed Congress an electric pistol that was specifically designed for the CIA. It used a poison dart that was intended to disintegrate upon contact with a body and not leave a trace as to the source beyond a small mark on human flesh. Remarking on the Colt .45, TIME magazine reported "the gun fires a toxin-tipped dart, almost silently and accurately up to 250 ft. Moreover, the dart is so tiny--the width of a human hair and a quarter of an inch long--as to be almost undetectable, and the poison leaves no trace in a victim's body." Committee chairman Frank Church remarked that it was an efficient method for killing people, to which Colby replied, "It is a very serious weapon."

Sunday, January 17, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - September 1972

14 September 1972
Maury reported on his conversation with Messrs. Flug and Epstein of Senator Kennedy's staff in response to the Senator's 18 August letter to the Director alleging improper contact [...] (for details see OLC's Memorandum for the Record).

Thuermer noted that White House staffer David Young will hold a meeting today to brief the press on the implementation of Executive Order 11652.

21 September 1972
Warner reported that Marchetti's lawyers have been in touch with Justice in connection with ACLU's filing a secret brief with the Supreme Court and said that the Office of Security will pick it up as a convenience to Justice.

Warner noted that the Director is one of several defendants in a civil case filed by Ellsberg and Russo.

Unumb noted a request from the National Observer for biographic data on Howard Hunt and James McCord in connection with a story they are doing on the Watergate incident. The Director endorsed his having provided only the dates these individuals left the Agency.

25 September 1972
The Director noted a call from Assistant Secretary of State Sisco [...]

Saturday, January 16, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - August 1972

1 August 1972
DDS related that Mr. [...] of the CI Staff received a call from the Secret Service requesting our training film on defensive driving. The Director interposed no objection to making this film available.

8 August 1972
Houston reported that Judge McArdle granted a motion for summary judgment in the Tofte case.

21 August 1972
Houston noted a telephone call from Howard Hunt who explained that his attorney was with him and had a question about a friend's past affiliation with the Agency. [...] DD/Sec, has reviewed the employment, and Houston reported that he replied directly to Hunt's friend, Mr. [...] that his old affiliation should create no problems in connection with his appearance before a grand jury.

22 August 1972
Thuermer reported on a call from a Mr. Crewdson of the New York Times who said he was "formally requesting" a photograph of Howard Hunt. The DDP observed that we are under no obligation to provide a photograph, and Thuermer said he had declined.

23 August 1972
DDI noted a letter from the McGovern campaign headquarters requesting the FBIS daily white book and any recent studies on Southeast Asia. A brief discussion followed and the letter will be disregarded.

Friday, January 15, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - July 1972

5 July 1972
Houston called attention to the judge's ruling in the Ellsberg/Russo case denying the defense motion for an evidentiary hearing, as a result of which the subpoena directed at CIA is suspended.

11 July 1972
DDI noted press attention attached to Secretary of Commerce Peterson's planned trip to the Soviet Union and observed that [...] It was also noted that [...] a secretary assigned to Peterson's office when he was Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, continues to work for him and may go to the Soviet Union. She will be in a LWOP status during the remainder of her tenure with the Secretary.

14 July 1972
Carver recalled that we have provided some briefings to Senator Eagleton on Vietnam. The Director said that in time we will receive instructions from the White House on briefing Senators McGovern and Eagleton.

20 July 1972
Houston reported that the Justice Department is anxious that no comment be made on the Ellsberg/Russo trial and that any inquiries should be referred to the Justice Department's Public Relations Office.

24 July 1972
Houston noted that he had called David Young's attention to the fact that the White House (NSC Staff) is not utilizing the new classification procedures.

25 July 1972
Maury reported that according to White House Staffer John Lehman, David Young is of the opinion that Estimates are subject to declassification after ten years. Houston will see Mr. Young to straighten him out on this topic.

26 July 1972
The Director . . . went on to ask the DDS for the background of a decision to have [...] of the Office of Security accompany Fred Flott on a White House survey of the drug scene in Southeast Asia. The Director said that in the future his or the DDCI's prior approval will be required in all cases where the Agency is asked by the White House or any other element of the Government to send an Agency officer on a narcotics-connected mission.

27 July 1972
DDP reported that Cord Meyer advised Bud Krogh of the White House staff of our unwillingness to have [...] accompany a new narcotics survey team to Southeast Asia and the possibility that Krogh may call the Director to reclama. The Director briefed on the background on this decision and noted his conversation with Al Haig on this topic.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - June 1972

6 June 1972
Thuermer explained that he will continue working with the General Counsel in response to Charles Nesson's efforts to serve a subpoena on him in connection with the Ellsberg case. He noted the related article by Robert A. Wright in today's New York Times, "Hearing Is Asked In Ellsberg Case."

7 June 1972
Houston noted a letter from the Justice Department conveying a subpoena directed to Angus Thuermer in connection with the Ellsberg case. He highlighted the schedule of documents requested, most of which were mentioned in footnotes to the Pentagon papers. He noted plans to ask Justice to declare the material irrelevant to the case.

8 June 1972
Houston said that he will be attending a meeting called by DOD General Counsel Buzhardt, who is recommending that Justice drop the case against Daniel Ellsberg.

19 June 1972
The Director noted the 17 June arrest of James W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate. With the Director of Security present to provide biographic details, the Director made it perfectly clear that responses to any inquiry with respect to McCord or Howard Hunt, who may be implicated, are to be limited to a statement that they are former employees who retired in August and April 1970, respectively. The Director asked that this guidance be disseminated via staff meetings. The Director asked that any inquiry from other elements of the government be referred to the Director of Security who is to be the focal point. Inquiries from the press are to be referred to Mr. Unumb who may say that McCord worked in the Office of Security. The Director noted that we have no responsibility with respect to an investigation except to be responsive to the FBI's request for name traces. It was noted that Howard Hunt may have done some work since retirement in connection with the preparation of supporting material for some awards. The Executive Director was asked to review this topic and report to the Director.

20 June 1972
In response to the Director's request, the Director of Security highlighted developments over the past twenty-four hours with respect to the McCord/Hunt, et al., situation. He noted that the late edition of the New York Times carries a different story by Tad Szulc than that which appeared in the edition received here (attached). The Director of Security anticipates some inquiries on Bernard L. Barker's situation, and it was noted that Mr. Barker was hired by the Agency in 1960 and terminated in 1966. The Director complimented Unumb on his handling of inquiries and asked that future inquiries be met with a response confined to the fact that, now that we have acknowledged that both McCord and Hunt are former Agency employees, we know nothing more about the case and the caller should be referred to the FBI as appropriate.

DDS noted that in response to State's request its chauffeurs who drive the Secretary of State and other senior State officers will be given a one-day defensive driving orientation at [...].

The Director noted receipt of a paper on a safehouse in Miami which is being made available to the Secret Service in support of its work in connection with the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. He asked the ADDP and the DDS to make it absolutely clear [...] that our cooperation in this undertaking is to be confined to provision of the safehouse and that it is not to be used as a site for investigations, interrogations, or "walk-ins," etc. The Director added that we will not loan people to the FBI or Secret Service in connection with their responsibilities at the Conventions nor will we provide equipment unique to the Agency.

21 June 1972
In view of the coverage in today's New York Times and Washington Post, Maury recommended that Chairman Nedzi be briefed on the McCord affair and that this briefing include all our information about the others involved. The Director asked Maury to touch base with the Director of Security and prepare a briefing paper on this topic for his review. Citing the number of distorted rumors about this matter, the Executive Director said that during the course of the day he hopes to provide a suggested Headquarters Bulletin for all employees for the Director's review.

Unumb noted a number of inquiries from the press with respect to the Cuban-Americans involved in the bugging attempt at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and their alleged involvement in the Bay of Pigs, etc. The Director asked that such inquiries be met with an explanation that we are not prepared to be helpful on this matter.

22 June 1972
Unumb observed that inquiries on the McCord/Hunt situation seem to be slackening off.

23 June 1972
The Director called D/OCI's attention to coverage of the McCord affair in the Metro Section of today's Washington Post and asked that future issues of the "CIA Operations Center Morning Newspaper Highlights" include press items on this topic.

Maury noted that he briefed Chairman Nedzi on the McCord/Hunt situation and on a security case.

26 June 1972
Houston noted the Fensterwald Freedom of Information case. The Director endorsed his plans to concur in the FBI's release of three photos, one being of Lee Harvey Oswald, which were acquired in Mexico and previously furnished to the Warren Commission.

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - May 1972

1 May 1972
DDS related that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service to provide two technicians in support of the Vice President's trip to Tokyo. The Director concurred.

2 May 1972
DDS reported that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service for counteraudio technicians to support the President's trip to Moscow. The Director concurred.

11 May 1972
Houston noted his correspondence with White House staffer David Young pertaining to our problems with Executive Order 11652 and added that Mr. Young has accepted our position on about 90 percent of our problems with the implementing draft directive.

24 May 1972
Houston explained that he had obtained White House Staffer David Young's understanding that we will not meet the 1 June deadline for producing internal Agency regulations implementing the NSC directive on Executive Order 11652. A brief discussion followed on the cumbersome bookkeeping and declassification authorities which may be required. The Director observed that the topic was sufficiently important for us to be in no great rush to meet a 1 June deadline and Houston assured him that Mr. Young understands.

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - March 1972

2 March 1972
Houston reported that the draft Executive Order on classification has undergone a few minor changes. He noted Director's letter to John Ehrlichman, dated 7 December 1971, with respect to our position on problems related to declassification and suggested that a copy be provided David Young, NSC staffer. After a brief discussion, the Director interposed no objection.

6 March 1972
The Director noted his memorandum to the Deputies and Independent Office Heads, subject: "Allegations of Assassinations." He asked that it be mentioned at Staff Meetings.

21 March 1972
The Director said that the President has seen his 17 February memorandum on reducing disclosures of classified intelligence and directed the White House staff to prepare a memorandum urging that all agencies comply with proper disclosure procedures.

22 March 1972
Houston reported that he is scheduled to meet with John Ehrlichman this morning.

23 March 1972
Maury reported that, after checking with Egil Krogh of the White House staff, he has made arrangements to brief Congressman Lester Wolff of New York on the Agency's role in international narcotics control.

Monday, January 11, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - February 1972

3 February 1972
A/DDS reported the House Appropriations Committee request for a finance officer to assist them in work on the budget. He added that we have provided such assistance in the past, and the Director interposed no objection.

7 February 1972
Houston explained that no action will be taken in the near future with respect to the Hans Tofte case, since the judge has been stricken with hepatitis.

8 February 1972
DDI noted the article by Michael Getler in Today's Washington Post, "New Spy Satellites Planned for Clearer, Instant Pictures." Later in the meeting the Director asked the DDS to advise the Director of Security to undertake an investigation of this leak of EOI-related information and to convene the USIB Security Committee.

11 February 1972
Carver noted his handling of White House staffer Sven Kraemer's request to FBIS for material concerning U.S. POWs. The Director reminded Executive Committee members of Dr. Kissinger's request that any inquiries from elements of the White House staff be referred to his staff for conveyance to the Agency.

Houston highlighted the meeting with John Ehrlichman on the NSC draft Executive Order on security classification. He noted the related article by Sanford Ungar in today's Washington Post, "NSC Urges Stiffer Law On Secrets."

16 February 1972
Lehman noted plans to continue briefing Attorney General Mitchell, whose resignation is effective 1 March.

Houston related that White House staffer David Young has invited him to review another draft of the new Executive Order on security classification.

28 February 1972
Houston said that he and [...] Deputy Director of Security, recommend the Director concur in the new Executive Order on classification, in light of their understanding with NSC staffer David Young, that some of the features of the Executive Order may not materialize. A brief discussion followed and the Director asked Houston to review the matter with him.

Who Does the CIA Hire? / What Does the CIA Look For?

Documentary filmmaker Allan Francovich explains in this interview the type of people the CIA tends to recruit and expounds on the nature and overall ethic of the CIA.

Allan Francovich (1941 - April 24, 1997) was an American film producer and director who made a series of films purporting to expose Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operations. Francovich suffered a heart attack while going through U.S. customs at Houston airport, Texas on April 17, 1997, and died at the age of 56.

Sunday, January 10, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - January 1972

7 January 1972
Maury said that according to Frank Slatinshek, Chairman Nedzi will rely on us rather heavily for support during his hearings on the problem of classification and handling of Government information (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 6 January 1972). The Director encouraged Maury to see Chairman Nedzi next week, and Houston suggested that the Chairman be provided with the Rehnquist study.

DDP briefed on work under way to limit distribution of reports [...] and noted that C/FI is completing a review of steps which might be taken to restrict dissemination of sensitive reports from all sources.

11 January 1972
Maury related that Frank Slatinshek is pressing for background materials pertaining to past efforts or studies related to the classification and control of information. He added that he and Houston will meet with the Director later today to discuss the availability of the Rehnquist study.

12 January 1972
Maury briefed on his and Houston's session with Frank Slatinshek and their provision of a large volume of material on past efforts to develop effective espionage laws.

Houston noted the President's nomination of Henry E. Petersen to become Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. He observed that Mr. Petersen has been most helpful to the Agency in the past, particularly on the Itkin case.

13 January 1972
Maury noted that the draft revision of Executive Order 10501, "Security Classification Procedures," which is being circulated by the NSD staff for comment, is a follow on to the Rehnquist study.

18 January 1972
DDI called attention to the article in today's New York Times, "Nixon Acts to End Security Leaks." (Excerpt: "Last July, two members of the White House staff, David R. Young of the National Security Council and Egil Krogh Jr. of the Domestic Council, were asked to investigate earlier leaks and prevent recurrences.")

Saturday, January 9, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - Late 1971

6 August 1971
The Director called attention to the article by Michael Getler in today's Washington Post, "CIA Patrols Into China Said Halted," and directed (1) that Maury write a letter for his signature to Senator Stennis making it clear that Senator Case was briefed on this topic and obviously leaked it; (2) that Maury brief Carl March on the background, including the fact that these operations were not terminated because of the President's projected trip to Communist China but because certain aspects of them were previously exposed in the press; (3) that the Director of Security (who was present at the Morning Meeting) get additional background from Maury and see White House staffer David Young; (4) that Goodwin reply to queries by saying that we know nothing about this matter; (5) that Houston and Maury utilize this incident in any material prepared for his use in opposing the Cooper bill; and (6) that the DDCI brief Dr. Kissinger or General Haig on this matter today.

** 13 August 1971
Knoche called attention to the article by Tad Szulc in today's New York Times, "Soviet Move to Avert War Is Seen in Pact with India," and said that the material contained therein on the reason for Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi is clearly from highly classified CS material. The A-DDP noted his concern over this breach of security.

16 August 1971
A-DDP noted that the article by Tad Szulc in Sunday's New York Times, "Attempted Pro-Soviet Coup in Yemen is Reported," contains information from a TDCS. The Director asked that he call this to the attention of White House staffer David Young.

18 August 1971
A-DDP noted that he has reported to White House staffer David Young on the results of the Deputy Director of Security's survey of those who saw the classified assessment upon which Tad Szulc based his 13 August article (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 13 August 1971). **

19 August 1971
"Maury briefed on White House staffer John Lehman's request for our assistance in determining what four volumes of the secret Pentagon papers Senator Gravel reportedly provided to Beacon Press for publication. He noted that Paul Chretien of OTR is an acquaintance of the Senator and may be able to assist. Carver said that the four volumes probably pertain to efforts to negotiate a settlement and outlined the sensitive material contained therein. Houston recommended against our involvement in this matter and suggested that the Department of Justice query Beacon Press. Maury said that the Director instructed that we do nothing until Maury consults with Clark MacGregor, Counsel to the President for Legislative and Congressional Affairs, who is out of town and will not return until the first of next week. In the meantime, Maury noted that he will determine from John Lehman whether they have considered consulting the Department of Justice on this matter." (DDCI in the chair)

20 August 1971
"Maury said that he called White House staffer John Lehman yesterday and cited the Code which would permit the Justice Department to go after the four volumes of the secret Pentagon papers reportedly given to Beacon Press. Lehman's reaction was that, since there is an existing policy preventing the use of subpoenas on this matter, he still hopes we will assist in determining what Senator Gravel may have given Beacon Press. The DDCI asked Maury not to utilize Paul Chretien's entree to the Senator without prior consultation with the Director, and Carver commented that he is opposed to our involvement (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 19 August 1971)." (DDCI in the chair)

23 August 1971
"The Director reviewed for Houston a conversation he had with a young lawyer who has reviewed the secret Pentagon papers in response to the Justice Department's efforts to prosecute. According to this attorney, Justice did not cite the appropriate provisions of the Code and has presented its case poorly."

10 November 1971
Lehman said that this is "leak day" in the Washington Post and called attention to the following articles: "Mao's Heir, Lin, Apparently Out in Power Shuffle" by Stanley Karnow, "North Vietnam's Next Move" by Evans/Novak, and "lin Piao is 'Finished'" by Joseph Alsop (attached). He noted that, while the article by Stanley Karnow provides good coverage of the topic, it has a State Department flavor. He also recalled that on 25 October we disseminated information similar to that contained in the Evans/Novak article. He mentioned that the Alsop article is probably the most damaging, since it includes material [...] The Director noted plans to do something about this problem but advised the A-DDP to cope with any adverse reaction [...] by noting the large volume of reports on the political situation in Communist China.

11 November 1971
In response to the Director's question Carver said that some work requested by John Ehrlichman is pending. The Director asked to be filled in later on the details.

20 December 1971
Lehman said that Jack Anderson's column in today's Washington Post, "Hussein: 'Help or I'll Go on a Ghazou'," contains verbatim language from an ExDis message from King Hussein to the President and added that he is looking into the distribution of this message.

28 December 1971
A-DDI called attention to Jack Anderson's columns in yesterday's and today's Washington Post (attached). He noted that the 27 December piece contained material from three SALT ExDis memcons and added that today's column contains quotes from a State LimDis cable and two TDCSs. A brief discussion followed, the DDP observing that, if these security breaches continue, we will have to limit severely the distribution of sensitive intelligence information.

Friday, January 8, 2010

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - July 1971

1 July 1971
"Carver noted that Secretary Laird had requested that our printing plant assist in reproducing the forty-seven-volume secret Pentagon study on Vietnam for distribution to the press and others this morning. This request was aborted by the President." (DDCI in the chair)

2 July 1971
"DD/S said that in the absence of [...] attended a meeting at the White House yesterday of the interagency group which is reviewing classification and declassification policy. The President spent an hour with the group and said that he wants: ... and (6) the revocation of all clearances and the return of all classified material held at Harvard, Brookings, Rand, and Cal Tech, as well as the withdrawal of Q clearances held by the Regents of the University of California. A brief discussion followed, and the Executive Director noted that DOD has asked us to provide information on all our contracts with Rand, as well as all clearances held by Rand personnel for our purposes. Acting Director asked that we assemble data pertaining to the President's remarks but that we take no action until the President's guidance has been confirmed and the DD/S has provided a memorandum on it." (DDCI in the chair)

"Carver reported that they will probably complete their detailed review of the secret Pentagon papers by 6 July."

"Warner called attention to Secretary Rogers' request that the press permit the Government to review in advance potentially damaging documents from the Pentagon papers."

6 July 1971
"Carver said that their review of the secret Pentagon study on Vietnam has almost been completed."

7 July 1971
"Carver said that he will be attending a meeting today called by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Henkin. He added that he assumes it will concern the declassification of some of the secret Pentagon papers and that, if it does, he will seek the Director's advice." (DDCI in chair)

"At the Executive Director's request, the DD/S agreed to get together with the DD/S&T and General Counsel to prepare a briefing paper for the Director on where we stand with respect to classified materials at Rand and efforts to safeguard them."

"Maury reported that Congressman Mahon would like to meet with the Director on 9 July to discuss the Pentagon papers and various world hot spots Carver said that he will prepare a briefing paper for the Director on the Pentagon study."

"Carver briefly noted [...] concern over the revelations in the Lansdale memorandum, which was surfaced as part of the Pentagon papers."

8 July 1971
"DD/S reported that a DOD security team is going to Santa Monica to repossess classified Defense materials held at Rand. He suggested that, rather than take parallel action, we send a Security Officer to observe the operation and inventory Agency materials in the possession of Rand. In response to the Director's question he explained that we have seven contracts with Rand; only one is classified, and it is with Rand's Washington office, although some material could have been sent to Santa Monica. The Director concurred and requested a review to determine the essentiality of current proposed contracts with Rand. Houston commented that according to DOD General Counsel Buzhardt, DOD is technically under instructions to lift the security clearances of Rand contractors but has taken no action. DDCI reported that John Ehrlichman had telephoned to advise us that the White House is appointing former CIA employee Howard Hunt as a security consultant. Later in the meeting the Director asked all Executive Committee members to review their lists of consultants to determine whether each is really needed."

"Carver briefed on his meeting yesterday with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Henkin and noted that any further excisions from the text of the secret Pentagon papers must be provided by Monday. He added that no decision has yet been made on whether to release to the public the volumes or a version thereof. The Director noted that we should oppose any such course of action."

9 July 1971
"In response to the Director's question Carver reported that none of [...] contained in the secret Pentagon papers has yet appeared in the New York Times. He added, however, that the Soviet Embassy has a complete copy of the forty-seven volumes.

16 July 1971
"Carver reported that the book which General Lansdale has been writing for a year and a half in now in the hands of the publisher, with some minor changes being made in light of revelations resulting from the publication of the secret Pentagon papers. In response to the DD/P's question Carver said that he might be able to arrange for us to read the text."
(DDCI in the chair)

"Tweedy noted that at White House request a PFIAB committee composed of Franklin Lincoln, Dr. William Baker, and Frank Pace will undertake a damage assessment of the publication of the secret Pentagon papers. He added that the committee will want to hear from us and spoke of plans for Houston and Carver to undertake this task."

16 July 1971
Carver said that [...] was most appreciative of the time which Houston spent with him yesterday.

20 July 1971
"Tweedy reported on a telephone call from Andy Marshall and said that Marshall and Rand President Henry Rowen are brooding about the security problem in Rand. Marshall expressed a desire to talk with one of our senior security officers when he next visits Washington in order to get a feel for security practices in general. Executive Director advised against our getting out front in terms of advising a major DOD contractor on security. The Director approved and requested that re respond to Mr. Marshall's request in low key and that the meeting be held in this building."

22 July 1971 (the day Howard Hunt came to see General Cushman)
"Carver highlighted his session yesterday with NSC staffer David Young, who is assisting John Ehrlichman in reviewing the secret Pentagon papers."

23 July 1971
"Carver highlighted his, Houston's, and [...] session with the PFIAB committee which is undertaking a damage assessment of the publication of the secret Pentagon papers. (See Morning Meeting Minutes of 16 July 1971.)

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Intelligence Analysis and Issues for Congress

The Intelligence Reform Act provides that the DNI will assume responsibilities for
managing the NIC. The DNI will be support by the NIC staff (probably numbering less
than 100 positions). This gives the DNI the capability to oversee the preparation of NIEs
and to ensure that the views of all agencies have been taken into consideration in interagency
assessments. A major change will be the fact that the NIOs and their staff will
work for one person (the DNI) while CIA analysts will report to a separate Director of the
CIA. Congress may ultimately assess whether these changes, as they are implemented,
have improved the efforts of the Intelligence Community and its analytical products.

The future responsibility for the production and presentation of the PDB/SEIBs is
uncertain. They are currently prepared by CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, and that
responsibility could be continued. On the other hand, if the DNI, rather than the CIA
Director, is to conduct the daily briefing for the President and senior White House
officials, it might be argued that the DNI and the DNI’s immediate staff should have
responsibility for the document that provides the basis for the daily briefings.

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Intelligence Analytical Products: The President's Daily Brief (PDB)

Left uncertain are responsibilities for preparing the written brief on current
intelligence that is prepared daily for the President and a very few other senior officials.
The President’s Daily Brief (PDB), along with the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
(SEIB) that has a somewhat wider distribution, have been prepared by CIA’s Directorate
of Intelligence (DI) and are considered that directorate’s “flagship products.”
Nonetheless, should the DNI be responsible for daily substantive briefings at the White
House rather than the CIA Director, it might be considered appropriate that the DNI staff
draft the PDB and the SEIB, based on input from the CIA and other agencies. The
number of analysts who actually prepare the PBD/SEIB is not large, but their work
reflects ongoing analysis in the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community. Some
might argue, moreover, that close and important links between CIA desk-level analysts
and the PDB would be jeopardized should the briefs be prepared outside of the CIA.

In addition, there are myriads of other analytical products: reports, memoranda,
briefings, etc. that are prepared on a routine basis. The Intelligence Reform Act does not
transfer extensive analytical efforts to the NID; leaving such duties to existing agencies;
the NIC will be responsible for assessments that set forth the judgments of the Intelligence
Community as a whole.

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

Alternative Views and Concerns About Politicization in Intelligence Matters

On many topics, there are inevitably different perspectives, and according to many
observers, policymakers are best served by rigorous presentations of alternative
positions.15 At the same time, however, some NIEs reflect an effort to craft language that
all agencies can agree on and thus to avoid airing differences that might draw agencies
into policy arguments between and among government departments. Agency managers
understand that too close involvement in a policy argument by intelligence analysts can
make their analyses unwelcome across the board. In addition, they well understand that
analysis is an uncertain science and art and that even the best analysts can miss
developments that loom large in retrospect and leave their agencies open to harsh
criticism or retribution.

Concern is often expressed about the extent to which intelligence products can
become “politicized,” i.e., be drafted to support or undermine certain policy options. A
charge of politicization is difficult to prove and is often dependent upon a reader’s
subjective viewpoint. Most observers believe that analysts make a conscientious effort
to avoid policy advocacy, but note that they are fully aware of policy disputes and may
have their own views that may, subconsciously or otherwise, influence their products.
There is, according to some observers, a tendency to avoid making intelligence judgments
that directly conflict with policy options that have been chosen. Observers caution that
placing intelligence analysis at the center of policy disputes can undermine the
effectiveness of the analytical contribution; they suggest that intelligence can best serve
by informing policy debates, but analysts cannot be expected to provide definitive
judgments that will resolve disputes that may involve a myriad of different factors, some
far removed from intelligence questions. In addition, observers note that it should be
recognized that policymaking sometimes involves making judgments based on incomplete
intelligence or on a willingness to accept risks and uncertainties beyond the ken of
analysts. Analysis can have a subjective quality to some degree and can be undermined
by unreasonable expectations.

The Intelligence Reform Act provides several provisions designed to ensure that
analysis is well-prepared and not politicized. In addition to having authority to establish
an Office of Inspector General, the DNI is to assign an individual or entity to ensure that
agencies conduct alternative analyses of information and conclusions in intelligence
products (section 1017). The DNI is also to assign an individual or entity to ensure that
intelligence products are “timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based
on all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic
tradecraft” (section 1019). Another section requires that the DNI assign an individual to
address analysts’ concerns about “real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or
politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis” (section


15 The views of different agencies as reflected in the October 2002 NIE, Iraq’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, are discussed in U.S., Senate, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S.Rept.
108-301, July 9, 2004. The report also contains a description of the NIE drafting process; see pp.

Monday, January 4, 2010

What Is It Like to Work for the CIA?

John R. Stockwell explains in the video clips that follow. Stockwell, a former CIA case officer, became a critic of United States government policies after serving in the Agency for thirteen years serving seven tours of duty. After managing U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War as Chief of the Angola Task Force during its 1975 covert operations, he resigned and wrote In Search of Enemies, a book which remains the only detailed, insider's account of a major CIA "covert action."

National Intelligence Officers

The most recent chairman of the NIC is Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings, who had
previously served in the State Department and in academic institutions.12 In addition,
there are senior analysts, known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), for Africa, East
Asia, Economics and Global Issues, Europe, Intelligence Assurance, Latin America,
Military Issues, Near East and South Asia, Russia and Eurasia, Transnational Threats,
Warning, and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation. The NIOs, who do not
receive Senate confirmation, come from a variety of government agencies, inside and
outside the Intelligence Community, and from the private sector.

National Intelligence Officers supervise the production of NIEs and other
community-wide products. Typically, an analyst in one agency is designated by the
relevant NIO to prepare a draft analytical product; the draft then is reviewed by relevant
analysts throughout the Community. Subsequently, if approved by the leadership of the
Intelligence Community (the National Foreign Intelligence Board) and the DCI, the draft
has been circulated to policymakers in the Executive Branch and, on occasion, to
Members of Congress. NIEs set forth the best information and judgments of the
Intelligence Community and are usually directed at significant issues that may require
policy decisions.

The NIOs have worked for the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence
Community rather than in his capacity as director of the CIA. (In the future they will
report to the DNI.) Thus, NIEs and related analytical products have not been CIA
products; they have represented the consolidated views of the Intelligence Community
(with alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community noted, in
accordance with the statutory mandate).13

It may be reasonably assumed that the NIC will continue to depend heavily on the
resources of the CIA. The CIA contains the most extensive analytical capability across
the board on all subjects that might concern national policymakers, as well as
considerable capability to support military commanders and mid-level desk officers. The
CIA was originally designed to be “central,” without obligations to support departmental
objectives as has been considered to be the case with the intelligence arms of the military
services and the State Department. In some areas, however, other agencies have more
extensive capabilities and can make an equal or greater contribution to NIEs and other
products designed to express the judgments of the entire Intelligence Community. Some
critics, moreover, charge that CIA on occasion develops an agency “position” that tends
to discourage alternate perspectives.14


12 For a listing of the NIOs and a description of the NIC’s functions, see here.

13 50 USC 403-3(b)(2)(A).

14 See S.Rept. 108-301, pp. 27-29.

Sunday, January 3, 2010

The National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Estimates

Under the new legislation, the Office of the DNI will include the National
Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of senior analysts within the Intelligence
Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector.8 The members
of the NIC “shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers fo the Intelligence Community
for purposes of representing the views of the [I]ntelligence [C]ommunity within the
United States Government.” The members of the NIC are to be appointed by, report to,
and serve at the pleasure of the DNI.

The Intelligence Reform Act, provides that the DNI, when appointed, will be
responsible for NIEs and other analytical products prepared under the auspices of the NIC.
The three statutory responsibilities of the NIC have been to:
- produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, included,
whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternative views held by
elements of the intelligence community;
- evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by
the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such
collection and production; and
- otherwise assist the [DNI] in carrying out responsibilities established in

The DCI historically, and the DNI in the future, has a unique responsibility for the
quality of intelligence analysis for consumers at all levels of government. While a
number of agencies produce analytical products, the most authoritative intelligence
products of the U.S. Intelligence Community are published under the authority of the DCI
and potentially the DNI. NIEs are the primary, but not the sole, form in which the
Intelligence Community forwards its judgments to senior officials, and they are the only
one prescribed in statute. NIEs are produced at the NIC’s initiative or in response to
requests from senior policymakers.

NIEs are sometimes highly controversial. They are designed to set forth the best
objective judgments of the Intelligence Community, but they occasionally are more
closely related to policy rationales than some analysts would prefer. An NIE produced
in October 2002 on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction has
been much criticized; a more recent NIE on prospects for Iraq has been the source of
significant media attention.10

Although the importance of particular NIEs to specific policy decisions may be
debatable,11 the NIE process provides a formal opportunity for the Intelligence
Community’s input to policy deliberations. Arguably, it is the responsibility of
policymakers to seek the input of the Intelligence Community, but most observers would
argue that the DNI should not be reticent in presenting intelligence information and
judgments on major policy issues when difficult decisions are under consideration.


8 50 USC 403-3(b).

9 50 USC 403-3(b)(2).

10 On the 2002 NIE see U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence
Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S.Rept. 108-301, July 9, 2004; on the
more recent NIE, see Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Intelligence Shows Pessimism on Iraq’s Future,” New
York Times, September 16, 2004, p.1. Neither of these NIEs has yet been made public; earlier
NIEs are occasionally released; see, for instance, Donald P. Steury, ed., Intentions and
Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington: Center for the Study
of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996).

11 See CRS Report RS21696, U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: the Iraq Experience.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Background on the Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis

The fundamental responsibility of intelligence services is to provide information to
support policymakers and military commanders. In reviewing the performance of the U.S.
Intelligence Community prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11
Commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
concluded that greater coordination of the nation’s intelligence effort is required to
enhance the collection and analysis of information. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission
recommended that a new position of National Intelligence Director (NID) be established
to ensure greater inter-agency coordination. A number of legislative proposals were
introduced in 2004 to establish such an office separate from the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).1

The NID was envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as having a number of budgetary
and managerial responsibilities.2 In addition, the occupant of the position would “retain
the present DCI’s role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president.”3 The
Commission also envisioned that the NID who would “be confirmed by the Senate and
would testify before Congress, would have a relatively small staff of several hundred
people, taking the place of the existing community management offices housed at the
CIA.”4 The Commission adds, however, that “We hope the president will come to look
directly to the directors of the national intelligence centers [the National Counterterrorism
Center, and other centers focusing on WMD proliferation, international crime and
narcotics, and China/East Asia] to provide all-source analysis in their areas of
responsibility, balancing the advice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting
viewpoints that may be offered by department heads at State, Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and other agencies.”5

There is some debate whether the 9/11 Commission envisioned the NID as having
the responsibility for coordinating national intelligence estimates and other community
products. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been responsible for providing
intelligence to the President, to the heads of departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and
“where appropriate” the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof.
The statute provides that “such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the
intelligence community.”6 Draft legislation in the fall of 2004 did include the assignment
of responsibilities for preparing national intelligence estimates to the DNI.

On December 17, 2004, the President approved the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the “Intelligence Reform Act”)(P.L. 108-
458). The Act incorporated many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, including the
establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the Director of
the CIA. Although most of the debates prior to passage of the legislation addressed the
DNI’s responsibilities for managing the intelligence budget, the Act also made a number
of changes affecting the preparation of analytical products for consumers at the highest
levels of government. The DNI will serve as head of the Intelligence Community and as
the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.7


1 For further detail on various legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600, Comparison of
9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Roberts Draft Bill, H.R. 4104, S. 190, S.
1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, Current Law; also, CRS Report RL32601, Comparison of 9/11
Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Collins/Lieberman Draft Bill, S. 2774, H.R.
5024, Administration Proposal, and Current Law.

2 See CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for

3 U.S., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 411.

4 Ibid., p. 414. (Subsequently, there appears to be a growing consensus to locate the NID outside
the Executive Office of the President.)

5 9/11 Commission Report, p. 411.

6 50 USC 403-3(a)(2).

7 P.L. 108-487, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005, signed on December 23, 2004,
provides that the DCI may discharge the functions of the DNI until the DNI is appointed.

Friday, January 1, 2010

Poland and Secret CIA Prisons

In September 2006, President Bush publicly acknowledged the existence of a secret
CIA program to detain international terror suspects worldwide. Earlier media reports
alleged that Poland and Romania were among the countries that had hosted secret CIA
prisons, although officials of both governments have denied these allegations. A
European Parliament probe conducted throughout 2006 cited no clear proof of prison sites
in Europe, but could not rule out the possibility that Romania had hosted detention
operations by U.S. secret services. However, in June 2007 a Council of Europe report
claimed to have evidence that U.S. detention facilities had been based in the two
countries. President Kaczynski has stated that, since he assumed office, “there has been
no secret prison — I am 100 percent sure of it,” and that he had been “assured there were
never any in the past either.”17

Some Poles have argued that, despite the human casualties and financial costs their
country has borne in Iraq and Afghanistan, their loyalty to the United States has gone
largely unrewarded. Many have hoped that the Bush Administration would respond
favorably by providing increased military assistance and particularly by changing its visa
policy, which currently requires Poles to pay a $100 non-refundable fee, and then submit
to an interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate — requirements that are waived for most
western European countries.


17 “Reports of Secret U.S. Prisons In Europe Draw Ire and Otherwise Red Faces.” New York Times. December 1, 2005. “European Aided US Renditions.” FT. June 8, 2007. “Inquiry Finds Evidence of Secret Prisons CIA Ran Facilities In Romania and Poland, European Agency Reports.” IHT. June 9, 2007.