Monday, November 30, 2009

3. Military Consequences

a. The Arab Forces.

(1) Character.

The bulk of the Arab forces fighting the Zionists will be semi-trained guerrilla groups and loosely organized tribesmen. There are three main sources from which the Arabs can raise men to light in Palestine; (1) Arab quasi-military organizations led by ex-army officers, which will form the core of the guerrillas; (2) soldiers volunteering from the official armies of the Arab states to participate in action against the Jews; and (3) tribesmen, who will probably be the largest source.

(2) Strength.

It is estimated that the largest number of Arabs actively engaged against the Zionists at any one time will be between 100,000 and 200,000, including Palestine Arabs, volunteers, Beduin, and quasi-military organizations from the other Arab states. The armed strength of the Arabs in Palestine itself is estimated at 33,000, most of wham are members of such quasi-military organizations as the Futuwwa. the Najjada, the Arab Youth Organization, and the Ikhwan (Moslem Brotherhood). Moreover, the Ikhwan will send contingents from its Egyptian and Syrian branches, which number 15,000 and 10,000, respectively.

The largest Arab group of potential fighting men is the tribesmen (Beduin) of whom some 30,000 are in the area immediately adjacent to Palestine.

They are expected to come to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs as soon as hostilities break out, and additional rising may be expected to swell the total Arab force as time goes on. Their service will probably be sporadic; but other tribesmen will replace any who drop out of the fighting so that the total Arab strength will undoubtedly be maintained.

The ground forces of the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen) total about 223,000 men, Including gendarmes, security troops, and police forces. Besides these ground forces, Egypt has a small navy, and several of the states have infant air forces and commercial planes, Although the Arab armies are not expected to be officially committed to the fighting, they will supply leadership to the fighters. These armies may also be asked by the new Arab state to enter Arab Palestine to maintain order.

(3) Materiel.

The Arab governments may be expected covertly to furnish arms and ammunition as well as trained military leadership to the guerrillas. Even before World War II, the Arab states had adequate supplies of weapons suitable for guerrilla fighting, These have been supplemented with arms taken from both Axis and Anglo-American dumps following the campaigns in the Near East and North Africa, and with purchase of materiel and equipment from US and UK surplus stocks, Negotiations for the purchase of Czech arms have been reported, The Arabs will, for the most part, rely on small arms rather than the elaborate materiel of modern warfare, though they may be expected to make use of armored trucks and tractors for attacking Jewish settlements. It is also probable that some light tanks and a few planes which can be used for strafing and bombing will find their way into Arab hands.

Supply constitutes no serious problem for the Arabs. Each fighter will carry his own equipment and will be supplied with funds for buying food from sympathetic villagers. The tribesmen, in particular, are hardy and well accustomed to bare subsistence rations and life in the open. Since they will be moving toward Palestine through Arab territory, they will have no difficulty gaining access to the water holes.

(4) Incentive.

The chief incentive to many of the leaders of this struggle will be opportunism, coupled with nationalist aspirations and religious fervor. The leaders, in turn, will appeal to the newly awakened nationalism as a strong incentive to many Arabs, particularly the better educated townsmen. Volunteers deserting from the armies of the Arab states probably will not incur the disfavor of their governments, and many will even receive secret encouragement from them. The proclamation of a Jihad will also be employed to secure volunteers although such a proclamation is not expected to kindle a mass uprising. The current drought in the northeastern Arabian desert will make the tribesmen restless, and the promise of loot from Jewish settlements will be attractive to many.

(5) Organization.

The Arab forces are expected to vary from relatively well-controlled quasi-military bands to the loose tribal organization of the Beduin, led by their sheikhs. Singleness of purpose wall be the main unifying force. Extensive guerrilla warfare in Palestine will give great power to opportunistic. aggressive, extreme nationalist leaders.who (in some instances) may even take over the governments of their countries, It has recently been reported that a unified command for all Arab guerrilla forces has been established.

(6) Course of Action.

Arab action will be directed not only against the Jews but also against any police force attempting to maintain order in Palestine. Guerrilla action is not anticipated until the final UN decision Is made known. The manner and timing of the British withdrawal will be an important factor in the fighting, which Is expected to increase steadily in intensity after the British withdrawal, eventually taking the form of an undeclared war of attrition against the Jews.

The Arab is a good guerrilla fighter while relatively few Jewish soldiers have had experience in guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, the terrain of Palestine is well suited to the Arab's traditional method of fighting. The quasi-military groups, composed of ex-army men and townspeople, will specialize in direct assaults on Zionist colonies, demolition of bridges and railroads. and other sabotage. The tribesmen will engage in activities not requiring technical training or extensive coordination such as attacks on isolated villages, assassination, continual sniping to prevent cultivation of the fields, and attacks on transportation, communications, and supply lines_ Persistent harassing attacks can be expected in time to wear the Zionist economy to the breaking point.

The Arab intelligence system has always been quick and accurate. The traditional "grapevine" can be supplemented by telecommunications and some aerial reconnaissance. Positions in the highlands will provide good observation posts. Also, since nearly hall the population of the Jewish state proposed by UNSCOP will be Arab, the Arabs will have a ready-made "Fifth Column" in enemy territory.

(7) Sources of Support.

The bulk of support for the Arab cause will come from the member states of the Arab League. Responsibility for financial support for the Arab cause will devolve primarily upon Egypt, and to a lesser extent upon the states receiving oil royalties, particularly Saudi Arabia. Support in the form of arms and men will come from all the Arab countries, but its extent will be conditioned by availability of transportation, particularly from such countries as Yemen and the more distant parts of Saudi Arabia. Aid from other Moslem areas, such as Pakistan and North Africa, is expected to be limited in quantity and to consist chiefly of money and moral support. Although the USSR has advocated the adoption of the majority report of UNSCOP with certain modifications, the Soviets will probably give covert aid to the Arabs as well as to the Jews in an effort to create chaos in the Near East. The Arabs will, of course, appeal to world opinion, but more for non-interference or for diplomatic support than for armed assistance.

b. The Jewish Forces.

(1) Character and Composition.

Although it has been estimated that Jewish and Arab forces will be almost equal numerically, the Arabs will have large numbers of replacements while

the Jews will have no reinforcements -unless they can facilitate additional emigration from Europe or obtain volunteers from the United States. The Jews will be well equipped, but It is doubtful whether the amount of ammunition they have on hand will be sufficient for a long campaign.

The Jewish forces in Palestine are composed of three organizations: (1) Hagana, the Zionist army; (2) Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) ; and (3) the Stem Gang. The three groups differ in their tactics and in the degree of ruthlessness employed in their operations, Hagana being the most sensitive to world opinion- IZL and the Stern Gang are illegal terrorist groups engaging In sabotage and assassination.

Hagana is sponsored by the Jewish Agency. The original and largest group, it is left of center in political sympathy. Because of its defensive work, its restraint, and its non-extremist intentions, Hagana is supported by a majority of the Jewish community of Palestine and by most Zionists. It has become primarily an instrument for the advancement of Zionism and would be a ready-made army for a Jewish state in Palestine.

It is estimated that in the event of hostilities Hagana could mobilize about 200,000 men and women with some combat or supply experience. At present Hagana is believed to have approximately 70,000 to 90,000 members organized into territorial commands under a central headquarters and consisting of three branches: (1) the static force; (2) the field army; and (3) the Palmach or storm trooper unit, The static force consists of settlers and townspeople based at Jewish settlements as a sort of home guard. The field army consists of about 16,000 troops trained in mobile operations. The Palmach is composed of approximately 5,000 permanently mobilized troops trained in commando tactics and supplied with, their own transportation. It includes a smaller group known as Palyam or Palteck, a kind of coast guard trained especially to assist Illegal immigrants arriving by ship.

Social and economic pressure has, in effect, made it compulsory for all able-bodied Jewish men and women in Palestine to serve one year in some armed organization. Thus, a year's term of enlistment is prerequisite to enrollment in Hebrew University. Hagana is well financed by a semilegal tax imposed upon the settlements by the Jewish Agency, by subscriptions, and by contributions from Jews in other countries. The organization also has European branches.

It has been estimated that enough modern weapons are available to arm up to 200,000 members of Hagana. There are also sufficient automatic weapons for each squad of Palmach, as well as some mortars. Hagana has been procuring arms over a period of years, many from the residue of the campaigns in the Near East and others smuggled in from abroad.

The effectiveness and timing of Hagana's diversionary attacks designed to aid illegal immigration are proof that it possesses an excellent intelligence system and that it maintains a high standard of security. "The Voice of Israel," a clandestine radio, is one of its chief mediums for disseminating propaganda,

The Irgun Zvai Leumi is estimated to have a strength of from 6,000 to 8.000 members. It is organized on a regional basis similar to that of Hagana but is cellular in character. It employs sabotage and terrorism as the "only effective" means of attaining its ultimate objective of an independent state in Palestine and Transjordan.

IZL, is rightist in political sympathy. It has foreign branches and in-creases its Palestinian membership with illegal immigrants, apparently being more interested in securing new recruits with military abilities than in funding a home for less fortunate "displaced" Jews. IZL members are well armed and trained in sabotage, particularly in the use of explosives. It has been reported, but not confirmed, that IZL and the Stern Gang have sufficient armor plate for transforming 500 to 600 tractors into improvised light tanks and for converting an unestimated number of automobiles into armored cars. IZL is believed to cooperate closely with the Stern Gang. and the two organizations are known to have conducted operations jointly. The infrequency of tactical errors in IZL's operations indicates that the organization has an excellent intelligence system with very tight security. It has its own clandestine radio station known as the "Voice of Fighting Zion."

The Stern Gang consists of from 400 to 500 extreme fanatics. They do not hesitate to assassinate government officials and police officers or to obtain funds by acts of violence against Jews as well as others_ Like IZL, they are well supplied with small arms, and the security of the group is excellent as its organization is limited to cells of three.

The founders of the Stern Gang were formerly members of IZL_ How-ever, when IZL restrained its activities against the British during the early days of World War II, the most extreme section of its membership formed a more terroristic body called FFI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) but more commonly known as the Stern Gang. The political connections of the organization are paradoxical and appear to be the result of opportunism born of necessity. Recent reports confirm the fact that the Stem Gang has connections with the USSR, which is furnishing it with money. The organization has stated that it considers a turn towards Soviet Russia necessary because of the present world situation. It explains that the USSR and the Stern Gang both desire the creation of a "strong and independent Palestine" which would constitute a rampart against British "imperialist designs" but would "not be hostile" to the Soviet Union.

(2) Course of Action.

In the face of an Arab attack, the three Jewish armed groups will be forced to unite. Members of IZL and the Stern Gang will probably be assimilated into Iiagana, which is already established along military tines and could readily absorb the other two groups into its commando units. Initially, the Jews will gain marked success over the Arabs because of superior organization and equipment, but the Jews will be unable to stand up under the long war of attrition which will develop. ,

The Jewish sections of a Palestine partitioned in accordance with the UNSCGP majority report will be vulnerable to attack by the Arabs. The northeast sector is entirely surrounded by Arabs: Palestinian on the south and west, Lebanese and Syrian on the north, and Transjordanian on the east. The central Jewish sector is flanged on the east by the central Arab sector, while the southern Jewish sector is surrounded by Palestinian Arabs on the west and north, Transjordanian on the east, and Egyptian on the south The Arab sectors contain the strategic highlands of Galilee and those surrounding the proposed international zone of Jerusalem.

Two major difficulties facing the Jews will be the large numbers of Arabs within Jewish territory (in the northeast Jewish sector, for instance, there are some 72,700 Arabs as opposed to 44,700 Jews) and the extreme vulnerability of outlying Jewish settlements and supply routes to Arab attack. The Jews will be forced to expend a large proportion of their forces in static defense of isolated villages and colonies, or organize many mobile units in key locations so that settlements under attack can be aided quickly, furthermore, many units will have to be used to convoy supply caravans. The establishment of strong defensive positions, within which normal economic life can be maintained, and the protection of transportation routes will be the main strategy of the Jewish forces. The Zionist colonies are estimated to have sufficient stores of food for a month's supply. Owing to the fact that many agricultural laborers will be engaged in combat and that Arab attacks will prevent cultivation of the fields, the Jews will have difficulty in producing food. Moreover, mobilization over a long period of time will so strain the manpower of the Jewish community that its economy will collapse unless large numbers of immigrants and substantial material assistance are supplied from abroad,

The Jews may be expected to employ small-scale, commando-type offensive operations against Arab concentrations if they are able to locate them, or attempts may be made to pursue retreating Arab raiders. Large-scale Jewish efforts to penetrate territory adjoining the contemplated Jewish state are unlikely because such actions would necessitate over-extending the already vulnerable supply lines and would entail the risk of combined rear, frontal, and flanking attacks by Arabs.

It is a distinct strategic advantage to the Jews that the important port of Haifa and the smaller port of Tel Aviv are included In the Jewish sectors, since any assistance to the Jews in the event of open conflict will come from the west.* It is expected, however, that, all cities will be centers of heavy fighting.

c. European Support for Jewish Forces.

There is already In existence a well organized system for transporting Jewish DP's from Eastern Europe southward, particularly through the Balkans, to Palestine. In the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict, this system would be employed to furnish man-power to the Jewish forces in Palestine.

Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, and the Balkans are gathered together in Austria, Italy, and Germany for transportation to Palestine. It has been estimated that about 1,800 Jews cross into Austria every month, In Italy, Hagana is reportedly operating a secret immigration service for the estimated 30,000 Jewish refugees registered there- Both the Rumanian and Bulgarian Govern-merits are helping Jews reach Black Sea ports in order to board ships which attempt to run the blockade into Palestine.

There has been some evidence that European agents of IZI, and the Stern Gang have been trained and are assisted by the USSR, The Jews will doubtless continue to solicit aid from the-USSR, but in the event of a Jewish-Arab war, it is unlikely that either side would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the


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9 The predominantly Arab port of Jaffa, although allocated to the Arab state by UNSCOP. is cut off from the Arab hinterland and thus will not be immediately useful to the Arab forces in the event of war.

exception of Czechoslovakia. France and Belgium, as well as Czechoslovakia, are thought to be likely sources of arms and ammunition for the Jewish forces. There have been unconfirmed reports of smuggling from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg for Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine. The Czechs are reported willing to sell arms to the Arabs; they would also be willing to supply arms to the Jews. if the transaction were financially advantageous. No estimate can be made of the amount and types of weapons which would be supplied.

d. Support Obtainable in the US.

No information is available upon which to base an estimate of the specific number of volunteers or the amount of funds and supplies to be made available to Jewish armed forces from US sources.

The Zionist movement is very strong in the US, but every organization claiming to represent all American Jewry does not in fact do so, and many Zionist organizations, while supporting the objectives of a National Home for Jews, do not advocate an independent Jewish nation in Palestine. The American Jewish Conference, the Jewish Congress, the New Zionist Organization, and the American League for a Free Palestine are among the leading groups Interested In the political aspects of Zionism which may be expected to support Jewish forces, The principal non-Jewish bodies espousing the Zionist cause are the American Palestine Committee, headed by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, the Christian Council on Palestine, and the Political Action Committee for Palestine, Inc. The last-named organization has recently expended approximately $80,000 for purely military supplies. Because it is illegal to supply arms from the US to Jewish groups in Palestine, figures arc difficult to obtain, although part of most Zionist funds collected is probably allotted to the purchase of military supplies.

While no authentic figures are available, it is estimated that support of Jewish armed forces by US private organizations will be on the order of, or somewhat greater than, similar support by US citizens of Government forces in the Spanish Civil War.

Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States. Clearly, the design and development of our intelligence equipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experiments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed.

b. [...] System - About 1968, this system was tested [...] This system is designed to permit intercept of [...] Recordings of these [...] intercepts were carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

c. Telephone Intrusion Study - [...] Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. [...] Message content is of no interest and will not be recorded. Overseas testing is planned at a subsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems [...] have been carried out to verify initial concepts. The duration of testing was less than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include [...] and [...] In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

e. Remote Physiological Measurements - An ORD-developed [...] is being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph [...] Some test subjects are witting, but most tests are on naive subjects (they do not know they are being tested). The [...] is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held.

f. Personality Structure of Defectors Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University.

g. [redacted]

h. Communications Link Loading Study - Under carefully controlled conditions, some U.S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content.

Sunday, November 29, 2009

2. Political Consequences

Arab nationalism is the strongest political force in the Arab world. It grew up in secret societies under Ottoman rule, came out into the open in the Arab Revolt of World War I, and has been the major factor in the independence movement in the Arab world ever since. The independence of all the Arab states in the Near East throws into high relief the continuing mandatory status of Palestine, Because of the strong ties between the various Arab states, political developments in any one country are of vital concern to Arabs everywhere- Palestinian independence is, consequently, the major aim not only of the Palestinian Arabs but also of Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis, Transjordanians, Egyptians, and Saudi Arabians. It would be political suicide for any Arab government to ignore this situation.

The signing of the Arab League Pact in March 1945 was a victory for the Arab nationalists in that it hastened the day when they could form their own bloc in relation to the other great powers of the world.

The Arab nationalist movement in Palestine has been as active as in any other Arab country. The uprisings of 1929 and 1936 demonstrated the strength of this movement. A stamp commemorating the signing of the Arab League Pact in 1945 appeared in Egypt showing a cluster of flags of country members, one of which was a white flag Inscribed "Palestine." Palestine has been represented at meetings of the Arab League, first by independent individuals and then by the representatives of the new Arab Higher Committee, formed in 1945. At the conference of the Political Committee of the Arab League in October 1947 it is significant that the Mufti, as Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee. played a leading role. Although the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League. have differed as to the advisability of testifying before UNSCOP, the members of the League are in complete accord over the injustice of partition to the Palestinian Arabs.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage, while the political aims are the independence of all Arab lands and the establishment of some degree of unity among them. The nationalists regard Palestine as the chief stumbling block to the achievement of their political aims. Despite the fact that Arabs and Jews have lived peaceably side by side, determination to make Palestine an independent Arab country is strong in all of the Arab states, from the more educated and ambitious classes down to the poorest and most politically naive peasants. Arab national fervor is so explosive and pervasive a force that Arab government officials who recognize the political implications involved in flouting a UN decision will nevertheless have to oppose any decision for partition or run the risk of losing face.

(2) Religious Pressure.

The Arab governments are probably as greatly influenced by religious pressures as they are by nationalist pressures. The Arabs are capable of a religious fanaticism which when coupled with political aspirations is an extremely powerful force. Whether or not the Arab governments are capable of guiding this force is difficult to judge. It is very possible that certain religious organizations will take the initiative in organizing Arab resistance in Palestine.

The Ikhwan al Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood), with headquarters in Egypt, is an organization of young Moslems founded for the purpose of orienting Arab society in accordance with Islamic ideologies. Branches of the Ikhwan have been formed in Syria and Lebanon, and one of the most active branches is in Palestine. The Ikhwan regards Westernization as a dangerous threat to Islam and would oppose any political encroachment of Zionism on Palestine with religious fanaticism, should a "Jihad," or Holy War, be declared, the Ikhwan would be the spearhead of any "crusade." The Grand Mufti, as head of the Moslem Supreme Council, can count on the unanimous support of all members of the Ikhwan, who are assured of entrance into Paradise if they die on the field of battle.

(3) Tribal Pressure.

The tribes of the Arab countries are a powerful element in the political and military pattern, of the Middle East. The tribe is a group of related families under the leadership of a chief (sheikh) which may be joined in a confederacy with other tribes under a paramount sheikh. The economic basis of tribal life is pastoral nomadism involving periodic migrations to seek pasturage for camels, sheep, and horses, The nomad (Beduin) population of Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia has been estimated at 2,500,000.

The conditions of Beduin life have developed a hardy type of fighting man, not only imbued with a warlike tradition (combining religious fanaticism with an enthusiastic devotion to looting, plundering, and raiding) but also trained in the use of small arms and the methods of desert warfare.

Large stipends have been paid annually to the tribes of the Near East by whatever power wished to have their support, whether that power was British, French, or the local Arab government. Since the Arab governments now pay the stipends, they could rely on the tribes within their regions. The tribes would doubtless join the crusade, not only for reasons o' Arab patriotism but also for plunder, the assurance of additional stipends, and the thrill of battle. The Syrian Defense Minister stated on 9 October that as the Arabs marched into Palestine they "would be buttressed by 100,000 loot-seeking Beduin described as `mine fodder'."

The dramatic meeting of 500 Kurdish and Arab tribal sheikhs at Hllla in Iraq in October passed a resolution for a Holy War to defend Palestine. Although Prime Minister Saleh Jabr took the initiative in organizing this meeting, it is significant that the Arab and Kurdish leaders (many of whom are hostile to each other) consented to meet and to agree to a common program.

b. Probable Attitudes of Arab Governments.

(1) Toward a Jewish Sate.

The Arabs violently oppose the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine because they believe that Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world. In addition, they fear that the Jews will consolidate their position through unlimited immigration and that they will attempt to expand until they become a threat to the newly won independence of each of the other Arab countries. They believe that not only politically but also culturally the Jewish state threatens the continued development of the Islamic-Arab civilization. For these reasons, the Arab governments will not consider any compromise, and they categorically reject any scheme which would set up a Jewish state in Palestine. The meetings of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Lebanon crystallized this feeling of unanimity. In a note, which represents the views of all the Arab states. the Committee stated, "The Arab governments, themselves, shall not be able to restrain the feelings of their nationals revolting against the oppression falling on them, nor shall they stand with folded arms before a danger threatening all the Arab countries, but rather will they be compelled to take every decisive action which will guarantee resistance to the aggression and the restoration of justice." In addition, leaders in all the Arab states have stated their determination to resist.

1. Toward the UN.
The Arab governments are embittered by the UNSCOP majority report, which they feel was not arrived at Impartially. Speeches made before Zionist groups by the Guatemalan member of UNSOOP, following the return of the committee, have convinced the Arabs that certain members of UNSCOP had made up their minds on the question before the committee undertook its task.

However, the Arab governments are reluctant to break with the UN. At the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Cairo following the formation of UNSCOP, the Arab states were not willing to follow the lead of the Arab Higher Committee in boycotting the hearings. The Arab governments supported the Mufti in refusing to give testimony within the frontiers of Palestine, but they all presented testimony to UNSCOP subsequently in Beirut.

The Arab governments realize the debt they owe to the UN. The raising of the question of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon in the UN led to a speedy and satisfactory settlement among the French, British, and Levant States. Egypt has had an opportunity to air its views on the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and its claims to the Sudan. The UN has provided a medium for the immediate recognition and participation in world affairs of the young Arab states. Although the Arab states are adamant in their determination to make Palestine an Arab state, they will probably avoid a complete rupture with the UN should partition be imposed.

2. Toward the US and UK.

Since the Balfour Declaration the British have been the target of Arab political feeling in Palestine. The recommendation for the partition of Palestine as contained in the Peel Report of 1937 resulted in serious anti-British demonstrations by the Arabs. After the dissolution of the first Arab higher Committee In 1937, the arrest of Arab political leaders, and the escape of the Mufti and others across the border. the Arabs were convinced that Britain was crushing all hopes of Arab political Independence in Palestine. Although the Arabs welcomed the White Paper of 1939, they have continued to criticize the British for permitting Jewish immigration on a limited scale and for refusing to disarm the Jewish underground. As a result, however, of the UK's announced decision to terminate the mandate and to withdraw both its troops and administration from Palestine and its refusal to implement by force any settlement not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, British prestige in the Arab world has definitely improved.

US prestige, on the other hand, has steadily decreased with each new indication that the US supports the Zionists. The good will enjoyed by the US at the time of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud Conference and following US hacking of Lebanese and Syrian claims for Independence was short lived as a result of President Truman's support of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the Anglo-American Committee report.

After the publication of the Anglo-American Committee report, Arab popular feeling expressed itself in the bombing of the US Legation at Beirut and In the attempt to burn the USIS office in that city. The Arab governments' official attitudes were made known at the Bludan Conference. in which the US bore the brunt of the attacks. British-sponsored newspapers in the Levant States placed the responsibility for the Anglo-American Committee's findings on the US, indicating that the UK members of the Committee could only follow the recommendations of the US members, Gradually, within the last two years. the blame for the Palestine situation has passim from the UK to the US.

Because of long-standing cultural ties between the US and the Arab world, the friendly role that the US played in the achievement of Syrian and Lebanese independence, the partial dependence of certain Arab states on oil royalties from US companies, and the promise of increased royalties In the future, the Arab states would like to maintain friendly relations with the US. The Arab governments realize that without US financial aid and technical assistance, they will be unable to carry through the extensive projects that are needed if the standard of living is to be raised above its present subsistence level. little of this development will be possible, however, if the US supports a Jewish state in Palestine.

c. Probable Actions of Arab Governments

1. Against Palestine.
In the event of the partition of Palestine, it is unlikely that the Arab governments will openly proclaim war against the Jews. Pressure from the Arab people for an open declaration of war will be strong, but the governments doubtless realize that such a step in defiance of a decision passed by the UN would seriously jeopardize the Arab position in the UN. However, it is probable that large numbers of Arabs from the surrounding countries will join the Arabs residing within Palestine for the war against Zionism. These Arabs will be loosely organized under national leaders and tribal sheikhs. Volunteers will leave the armies, and ammunition and military equipment will find their way from the Arab armies to the resistance movement. The Arab governments though not officially endorsing such action, will doubtless allow it to continue.

2. Against Jews in Arab Lands.

Before the enunciation of the Balfour Declaration is 1917, the Jews in the Near East fared as well as other minority groups throughout the world. Since 1917, however, they have had to bear the brunt of Arab antagonism to the development of political Zionism in Palestine. In the event of partition, the lives of the trillion Jews throughout the Arab world (including Palestine) will be Imperiled. The lower element In the population would look forward to attacks on Jewish quarters because of the excellent opportunity for Iooting----as illustrated at the time of the Baghdad revolt in 1941 when the Jewish quarter was attacked, A representative of the Jewish Agency has stated that in the event of partition the 400,000 Jews in the Arab states outside Palestine may have to be sacrificed in the interest of the Jewish community as a whole.

3. Against the US and UK.
The Bludan Conference of 1946 established a course of procedure,' to be followed by the Arab states in the event that the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee should be implemented. Following the publication of the UNSCOP report and the speech of Secretary Marshall before UNCA, the Arab League Political Committee met and decided in general terms to apply the Bludan recommendations if partition were voted by the UN. However, in the discussions on the manner In which these recommendations should be applied, there was considerable disagreement in the Political Committee. Some of the Arab governments refused to consider a break in diplomatic relations with the Western powers, and others refused to cancel oil concessions. Nevertheless., there is complete unanimity among the Arab states as regards aim. They are all unalterably opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Whether or not they now agree on retaliatory measures against the US is beside the point; In time US interests will be seriously affected, if not by the decisions of the Arab governments, certainly by the instability and hostility which will inevitably be aroused in the Arab world.

The bombing of the American Consulate General in Jerusalem on 13 October is evidence of the Arab resentment against US support of the majority plan. This action was reported to have been taken by the newly formed Arab terrorist group which calls itself "the Jihad." Whatever the official position of the Arab governments may be, attacks on US property, installations, and personnel by irresponsible groups or individuals can be expected.

d. Aims of Jewish State.

Consolidation.
In spite of increasing tension and hostilities between various factions in the Jewish community, it can be expected that all Jewish groups in Palestine will join forces against the Arabs in defense of the newly formed Jewish state. The chief aims of the Jewish government will be organisation of defense and increased immigration.

Territorial Ambitions.
In the long run no Zionists in Palestine will be satisfied with the territorial arrangements of the partition settlement. Even the more conservative Zionists will hope to obtain the whole of the Nejeb, Western Galilee, the city of Jerusalem, and eventually all of Palestine. The extremists demand not only all of Palestine but Transjordan as well. They have stated that they will refuse to recognize the validity of any Jewish government which will settle for anything less, and will probably under-take aggressive action to achieve their ends.

Soliciting of Foreign Aid.
The Zionists will continue to wage a strong propaganda campaign in the US and in Europe. The "Injustice" of the proposed Jewish boundaries will be exaggerated, and the demand for more territory will be made as Jewish immigration floods the Jewish sector. In the chaos which will follow the implementation of partition, atrocities will undoubtedly be committed by Arab fanatics; such actions will be given wide publicity and will even be exaggerated by Jewish propaganda. The Arabs will be accused of aggression, whatever the actual circumstances may be. This propaganda campaign will doubtless continue to influence the US public, and the US Government may, consequently, be forced into actions which will further complicate and embitter Its relations with the entire Arab world.

___________________________________________
The "secret" procedure decided on is reported to include the following provisions:

Not to give the US and UK or their local communities any new concessions, economic or otherwise.
Not to support US and UK special interests in any educational institution/
To institute a "moral boycott" against the US and UK.
To consider cancellation of any concession in the Arab world
To make a strong case of the Arab cause before the UN.

e. Attitude of the USSR.

The USSR's aims in Palestine are: (1) to end the British mandate and bring about the removal of British troops from the area; (2) to keep the situation unsettled; and (3) to take an active part in "maintaining order" in the country. The USSR has been highly successful in carrying out the first two aims— without any effort on its part. The accomplishment of the third aim would give the USSR a base in the heart of the Near East from which to disseminate propaganda, carry on subversive activities, and attempt to organize "democratic movements" in the Arab states.

By first recommending a bi-national state in Palestine, the USSR has made at least a gesture toward the Arabs. By supporting partition, the USSR has set ' itself up as the champion of minorities and has posed as a power attempting to find the "just solution" for Palestine. The USSR could now logically claim that Kurdistan should be set up as a Kurdish state and that Kars Province of Turkey should be joined to Soviet Armenia.

Meanwhile, the USSR has been actively but secretly assisting the Jews. In addition to reports that the USSR is assisting Jewish underground agents in Europe, large ships filled with illegal immigrants have been leaving the Rumanian port of Constanza- The British have watched with suspicion Soviet "lumber ships" leaving the Black Sea for Palestine which, the British claim, are carrying arms below decks to both the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

In the event of Arab-Jewish hostilities, the USSR will continue to support the Jews and will probably also attempt covertly to aid the Arabs,

I. Effect on US Economic Interests in Near East, (1) oil.

If partition is to be implemented in Palestine, it appears unlikely that the Arab governments will initially cancel existing oil concessions. Such action would have the combined effect of alienating the US and cutting off future oil royalties. The subject of cancellation of oil contracts was discussed at the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee in Aley, Lebanon, in October 1947. The Saudi Arabian delegate, stating that the oil companies were private corporations and did not represent the US Government, opposed the Iraqi delegates stand that the contracts should be cancelled.

However, all oil installations and oil pipelines in the Near East would be endangered. Desert pipelines are vulnerable to attack by small Arab bands. which could cut the lines and disappear before they could be arrested. The Arab governments probably would not support such irresponsible action, but they would not be able to stop it. Operations outside the actual oil centers. such as Kirkuk and Dhahran, would be greatly hampered, and the oil companies would be forced to restrict production.

Although existing oil contracts will probably not be cancelled, it is possible that the Arab governments will refuse to enter into any new oil contracts with the US. The Syrian Government, for example, has already postponed ratification of the pipeline agreement with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, Whatever their individual desires may be, pressure from the people as well as from the Arab League as a whole may prevent them from entering into any new concessions.

(2) Commerce.

In the event of partition US trade and commercial relations with the Arab world will be seriously affected. The establishment of an Arab boycott, even though only partially effective, would act as a brake on the slowly but steadily improving commercial relations between the US and the Arab states. Such a boycott would also serve as a bar to American participation in projects for the improvement of living standards, increased production, and expanded irrigation programs, many of which would otherwise include the employment of considerable American materials and technical skills. Even more important, perhaps, would be the general instability in the area. Such instability could be expected to reduce the size of US investments in the area as well as the returns from present or contemplated investments, thereby impairing the dollar-earning capacity of the area and its ability to purchase from the US.

It is unlikely that existing air agreements will be canceled, but the negotiation of new ones may well be delayed throughout the area. Other countries will be quick to take advantage of the inevitable deterioration of relations between the US and the Arab states.

Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted in use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Executive Office of the President
ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)

Office of Telecommunications Policy
Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning a Radar People Detector developed for OSD.

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has been conducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy.

State Department
Two contracts for development of countermeasures techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and devices. These Laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the [...]

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)
Reports and information about the ORD-developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA.

Treasury
[...] is being detailed to Treasury Department to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug enforcement administration. The request for his services was made by [...] the Agency's Narcotics Coordinator. Mr. [...] discussed the request and cleared the detailing through Mr. Colby.

Customs/Treasury Department
Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS
About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.

Secret Service
We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
The results of our research work in the detection of metals [...] were reported to FAA for possible use in the detection of hijacker weapons.

National Institute of Health (NIH)
At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support ACDA needs.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

Secret Service
FBI
U.S. Customs

[...] total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance conutermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and USDA
We have an on-going program, [...] to [...] for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association would be SECRET)
The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experimental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat crop. A part of the information would be obtained from a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-truth data will be collected on North American crops.

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium poppies.

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon Air Force, Office of the Inspector General Army, Office of Provost Marshall General
We have exchanged technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information with them.

U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Toelle Ordnance Depot

ORD tested environmental samples from testing, storage and production facilities in the U.S.

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal
ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing [...]

U.S. Navy
[redacted]

U.S. Coast Guard
About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)

San Mateo County Sheriff's Office
ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assessment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff)

Chief, [...] Police
For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of a study to evaluate attempts [...] to penetrate [...] social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief)

Saturday, November 28, 2009

The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine

1. Introduction

On 1 September 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) completed its report, and a majority of its members recommended partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem. In spite of violent opposition from the Arab states and the possibility that partition would not receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the UNGA, there is no doubt that this type of solution of the Palestine problem has been more seriously studied and more generally accepted than any other. It is important, therefore, to attempt to determine what the consequences of partition will be.

The General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine has presented to the GA a partition plan based on the majority report of UNSCOP. Although no final decisions have yet been reached on implementing and enforcing the eventual UN recommendation, certain basic assumptions can be made. If the UNGA (now debating the partition scheme) accepts by a two-thirds majority partition for Palestine, the following situation will result:

a. A sovereign Jewish state, comprising a substantial part of the area of Palestine, will be established.

b. A substantial number of immigrants will be permitted to enter this Jewish state.

c. The Arabs, not only of Palestine but of all the Near East, will strongly oppose both a and b above, and armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs will take place.

d. Assistance in the form of men, arms, and supplies will be afforded both the Jews and the Arabs from outside Palestine.

e. The United Nations will not immediately organize an international police force to keep the peace in Palestine.

On the basis of these assumptions, three questions must be answered:

a. How will the Arab-Jewish conflict develop, and with what results?

b. How will the stability of the Middle East be affected?

c. How will US strategic and commercial interests be affected?

In order to answer these questions, an examination of the political situation resulting from partition and the military developments which may arise from that situation follows.

Technical Training for Local Police Department

I. The first segment of technical training by Training Branch was conducted during the period 7 October - 26 November 1968. The following schedule and subjects were used in the training of six members of the Metropolitan Police Department.

A. 7-18 October - Surreptitious Entry
Content of Subject taught:

1. Familiarization and identity of American locks.
2. Method of manipulation of locks.
3. Methods and techniques of conducting Surreptitious Entry Survey.

B. 21-29 October - Photo Surveillance
Content of Subject taught:

1. Familiarization with cameras: Pentax Spotmatic, Leica, Nikon F, Robot and Polaroid.
2. Lens, telephoto and wide angle.
3. Exposure Meter, Tripods, Bowum, etc.
4. Film, film processing and print processing.
5. Document copy exercises.
6. Night Photography and night exercises.
7. TV Surveillance.

C. 18-23 November - Audio Surveillance
Content of Subject taught:

1. Microphones, wire impedances and line amplifiers. (Shure MC-30, Sennheiser MM-22, RCA - BK - 6B and RCA BK-12a all commercially available)
2. RF commercial transmitter. (Research Products, Tracer Inc., Scientific Research Corp.)
3. [...]
4. Telephone Taps. (Obsolete model DR-2 equipment which are available to government and law enforcement agencies).
5. Recorders (Ampex-601-2 Stereo, Revere T-204 Mona, Uher 4000L, all commercially obtainable).
6. Plastering and Wall Restoration.

D. 24-26 November - Operational Problem and Exercise

1. This problem entailed an operational exercise against three of our Safesites. The students had to survey, case and penetrate these locations using surreptitious entry, photography and audio surveillance.
2. All these safesites, two apartments in [...] and one on [...] have been turned back to Agency Real Estate and have since then been terminated. Formal class instruction was conducted at [...].

II. After this first MPD group other police departments personnel trained using the identical safe sites and employing the same subject matter and commercial equipment as indicated above were taught on the following dates: The Fairfax Police Department and Arlington Police Department. Date - 21 October - 10 December 1968. Six officers, 4 from APD and 2 from FPD.

III. In 1969 additional officers from the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax Police Department and Arlington Police Department received identical training as that stated above. In total 24 police officers were trained in our facilities.

Friday, November 27, 2009

Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION: Executive Officer

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Date County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordinance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

C/TSD/OPS/SDB

Summary of Comments by Certain Personalities Made in Private Interviews - December 17, 1948 to January 19, 1949

Key Designation

A. "Propaganda has failed; the UN has failed; the Arabs are divided. What is the use of empty threats by Farouk, Ibn Saud, etc., when there is nothing they can deliver?

"Abdulla at least has a program. No one else is acting effectively. He is the lesser of evils, although he is not reliable himself. But he might stop the Jews.

"Syria suffers from no program. There is profound discontent, a demand for a real economic program. Otherwise the country will be bankrupt and in chaos.

"Only a Greater Syria will provide the economic means to enable the northern Arab countries to avoid revolution and escape Communist domination. This Greater Syria, however, should not be under the crown of Abdulla of Transjordan, but under the crown of the King of Iraq, with viceroys representing him in Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine.

"The northern countries cannot hope for support from Egypt or Saudi Arabia from which they are separated physically by Israel and by the unreliable British puppet, King Abdulla. In spite of the infiltration of Iraq by Communist propaganda, I feel sure that Iraq is more secure than Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood will continue its assassinations, and where King Farouk keeps a plane fueled up for a quick departure to his happy hunting grounds in Rhodesia."

B. "I have no confidence in the new Syrian Government [...]. Syria cannot be saved by a reshuffling of the same faces in the Government -- most of whom are content to hold office and draw salary. Syria cannot be lifted from its demoralized condition after the Palestine defeats, or preserved from the threat of bankruptcy and of civil strife unless there is a profound reform and a constructive economic program reaching and benefiting the common people. So far as Aleppo is concerned, we have no reason to believe that the new Syrian Government will be any better than its predecessors."

C. "The last chance for a peaceful and reasonable solution of the Major Powers was the Bernadotte Proposal for the frontiers between Israel and Arab Palestine. At that time I still believed that there was a chance for UN officials and the general American public to consider limiting Israel to reasonable frontiers which would leave in Arab hands the principal centers of Arab population. Unfortunately no Major Power supported the Bernadotte Plan. After Bernadotte's assassination, I spoke with the two top men responsible about the solution I have described, and both said, 'Yes, that is a very sensible plan and a very fair solution if it could be arranged.' But nothing ever happened about it. It was like a subject of the weather -- which Mark Twain said everybody talks about but no one does anything about."

D. "Strange as it may seem to you, I now favor the partition of Palestine. Convinced as I am that the Zionists will continue their aggressive policy of expansion in the effort to exploit the Arab World, I think we Arabs are much better off to have Israel behind definite frontiers resulting from partition than to have to include the Zionists in a single State of Palestine and have them, with their propaganda and endless financial resources, gradually work from within Arab Councils and the Arab League to undermine Arab interests. I believe it is better to have your enemy in a neighboring lot with a fence between, behind which he is supposed to stay, than it is to have him as a part owner of your own farm with freedom to roam all over your own house and property."

E. "I am concerned about nepotism in the Saudi Arab Government, especially with regard to the Royal Family and the Minister of Finance. Other advisors of the King seem to rise or fall in accordance with their personal services, but the Minister of Finance is entrenching members of his family in positions of Government responsibility without regard to their competence. His nephew, who is practically an idiot, is getting too much control of finances. Although the King makes good use of a few of his older sons, some of the others are intriguing and running up debts in a way that does not promise well for their conduct if the King should die, and they should be free to suit themselves. In my opinion, Saudi Arabia is entirely too much bound to the Royal Family and to the family of the Minister of Finance, without any opportunity for others to reach positions of responsibility."

F. "I myself and a number of my family have lost all faith in the program of the Mufti and in any of the Arab leaders proposing plans for Palestine. Together with three of my cousins, [...] we are in close touch with the Communist agents with whom we meet regularly. As a good Muslim, I do not believe in the Communist doctrine, but I also do not believe that Russia is helping the Jews because she cares about them. Opposed as we are by American sympathy for Israel, and abandoned as we are by the British who used to supply us with arms, we shall look for help wherever we think we may find it; and I believe that we say find help in Russia, to whom your country also turned when you were fighting for survival in the recent war."

G. "We still feel the way we did about Palestine, but the Arab program for Palestine has been defeated for the time being; in fact, there was never really any agreement on an Arab Plan for Palestine. King Abdulla would sell his fellow Arabs into slavery or permit them to perish if he could increase his own power. You may be sure that Saudi Arabia will follow a realistic course in its own national interest and will not be diverted by any sentimental or fanatical considerations, nor by any foreign interference. Insofar as we can do so without the loss of independence we shall cooperate fully with Americans and British in economic matters and in the technical developments needed in Arabia, but in politics we shall be very careful before deciding what other countries or governments will be our friends."

H. "I believe that popular enthusiasm for Israel has passed its peak with the successful establishment of that State. I understand that some of the principal Jewish supporters are already cutting down their contributions, and it may be that financial resources will steadily dry up. If this is understood and believed by Israeli leaders, they may be willing to compromise their ambitions and settle down in a limited state such as the territory they now occupy. If, on the other hand, they are confident of continuing resources, the extremists may win out, and they may continue to seize additional territory. This continues to be the chief threat to peace. The United Nations has not been able to agree on definite borders for the Israeli State which already administers territory it was never contemplated she should have; and without agreement among the powers to establish the frontiers, the hope for peace depends upon the reasonableness of both Jews and Arabs in accepting boundaries that constitute a compromise, and then remaining within those boundaries."

I. "The leaders and the people of Israel, as I have seen them in Haifa, Tel Aviv and elsewhere during the past eight months, are exultant and confident as a result of their victories, and of their recognition by the world powers. They include many men with brains and ability, and they have ambitious plans for their State.

"In spite of what some Israeli leaders have claimed, the Israelis drove the Arabs from their homes and never invited them to remain peacefully in Israel until after they had left and their property had been confiscated. The homes have been and are being rapidly filled with Jewish immigrants. This is true of the cities and towns; as for the small villages and farms, the present procedure is to obliterate and plow up the Arab hamlet or farm and build a Jewish settlement with a new name, wiping out all trace or record of their previous Arab location and property. The purpose in all of this is freely admitted -- that the Israelis want to make impossible the compensation of Arabs driven out even though such compensation should be forced upon them in principle by some world authority. How can one estimate the value of a home and property which has been obliterated, and of which no record remains? There is no question about it in my mind: Arabs will not be permitted return to Israel and compensation will not be made to them. On the other hand, there is a desperate effort being made to invite back certain Arabs with Communist leanings who may be used for propaganda purposes against their fellow Arabs. A few hundred such Arabs have returned upon the invitation of Israeli authorities.

"The Israeli military leaders have told me that if the first truce had not come when it did they would have lost the war. During the three months following the first truce, the airplanes-with-mechanics which arrived from Czechoslovakia and the arms and explosives purchased in many places, coupled with the complete embargo on arms to the Arabs and political dissension among the Arabs gave the Israelis a striking force which was decisive.

"Israel still faces a major problem even if she does succeed in controlling her extremists and expansionists. This is the problem of maintaining the standard of living which she has thus far enjoyed by virtue of a very high subsidy from abroad. The cost of living in Haifa and Tel Aviv is 500% of the average cost of the period 1933 to 1939. There is no cheap labor; wages and rents are exorbitant.

"The people cannot possibly live off the land and sell their produce to compete with the Arabs in neighboring countries, who are raising the same fruits and vegetables at less cost. The danger in this situation is that Israel will not accept a lower standard of living nor reduce her population to the number which the land would support. She expects to maintain the prosperity of the country either (1) by continued financial support from the Jews of the world and their sympathizers, or (2) by exploitation of the neighboring Arab countries where she expects to find the cheap labor and the raw materials."

J. "I have seen Bunche and General Riley several times. Both were hopeful of a Palestine settlement, if Zionists could be restrained.

"British General Gale, commanding Suez Canal Zone, and U.S. Admiral Sherman, are ready to act to protect their nationals, or evacuate them from the area.

"Ambassador Griffis acted on the Bernadotte Plan, sought to secure Arab agreement to it, only to be slapped down by Washington. One day Griffis told me he had received the same day four telegrams from Washington, all mutually contradictory... Wealthy Jewish friends of Griffis in the U.S.A., when he tried to secure their support for the Bernadotte Plan, slapped him down and refused to back him as they promised to do.... Griffis hoped to get Egypt in line to have Egypt withdraw from the Arab group and align itself with the West, leaving Syria and Lebanon in the lurch... Griffis never permitted any telegram or despatch from the Embassy to carry any anti-Jewish news, nor any anti-Arab news. Ireland is more free to report the truth of Israeli violations, etc., since Griffis has left... Israeli recruits in the last six months have been 40% from behind the Iron Curtain."

K. "Britain is backing Abdulla of Transjordan, with the purpose of Balkanizing the other Arab countries and making them come crawling to Britain for protection and separate treaties. It is all a matter of arms, planes, military transport, and Britain will deal it out to her puppets alone."

L. "Syria will go to pieces in time. There is no powerful friend, too many centrifugal forces pulling it apart. Abdulla is nothing in himself, no resources, natural or financial. He must therefore be a puppet and cannot act independently. He is a safe investment until the British drop him."

M. "A die-hard: Arabs must maintain morale and never compromise. I was against war but having embarked, the Arabs must keep it up, cold and hot, until victory, no matter how many years. Morale must be sustained. Dunkirk, Stalingrad, prove one can survive temporary battle defeats, provided the will-to-victory remains. Abdulla will be thrown out of Arab League, and the fight will go on. The Israelis are NOT invincible. How can three-fourths of one million Jews overcome thirty-five million Arabs in the long run?"

N. "Lebanon -- most stable and reliable Arab country. Tapline would be decisive in its economy, and successful. Griffis is wrong in urging Egypt as a better route. Egypt's future will be decided by other factors. (You cannot marry Egypt to reform her -- she is too far gone.) Egypt is less secure as a pipeline route than Lebanon.

"Syrians are convinced of Tapline's value. When a government is formed it will ratify early. To be sure, Syria is precarious, and in a couple of years it may be broken up by the Greater Syria plots of Abdulla, but whoever owns and governs the Tapline area will probably be sensible enough to protect it.

"When I got an autographed photo from Abdulla, the King signed it in red ink, 'the color of the Hojaz', but I think Britain would not allow Abdulla to attack Saudi Arabia.

"In time, Abdulla will probably take over the Jebel Druze and Damascus. He will not touch Lebanon which, he said, 'is like a beehive, very active and full of honey, but better not stick your finger in.' At the same time, the Communists may take over northern Syria, the Jerzirah, Aleppo, etc. The Soviet Minister to Syria and Lebanon, reported to be on indefinite leave or transfer, suddenly returned to his post."

O. "In our opinion, no Syrian Government formed now will be stable. The discontent is too profound.

"Well-known Communist sympathizers among the Arab refugees have been invited back to their homes by Israel, and have gone back. Russia is arming Israel and preparing some day to take over the internal government. The Israelis have been successful in winning the favor of observers by lavish hospitality, including champagne and Jewish women."

P. "The U.S. Government has lost both Israel and the Arabs. Israel is already a tool of Russia. The Arabs can never cooperate with Russia but they have lost all faith in the U.S. Their only hope is to refuse to agree to any rape of their land. Let the Jews seize what they can, they will over-extend themselves and fail in the end. The Arabs will not and cannot submit."

- end -

Thursday, November 26, 2009

V. Russia's Purpose

18 March 1949

Although Russia has officially sided with Israel she is actually on the side of disorder and hunger. Russia and her satellites armed Israel to an extent few people in the United States understand, but Communists are also active among the Arabs. They may upset the Iraq Government at any time; they have succeeded in establishing contact with the President of Syria to whom overtures have been made; they have captured the leadership of Arabs in Nazareth, Jaffa, and Acre, who are despairing of any effective help from Arab countries and are turning to Communism. (In Nazareth, for example, no one can hold or get a job without the permission of the Communist boss.) The USSR will help Israel expand until the Arab Governments as well as British and American policies are completely discredited. The Russians will then decide whether to make a puppet of the Zionists or of the Arabs -- if the situation in the Near East continues to degenerate, Russia may find both parties begging for the honor. The Prime Ministers of two Arab countries told me they have reason to believe that, blocked in Western Europe, Russia will divert her Cold War to the "soft-underbelly" of the Near East.

TSD Support to Other Agencies

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

6. Issuance of forged personal identity documentation by TSD is controlled according to two broad criteria: type of requester; and type of documentation requested. A request for denied area documentation from a DDO Area Division is honored after proper validation. Free world documentation may require some extra coordination however.

7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher Agency authority, no U.S. documentation is issued by TSD Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. TSD Regional Bases require at least the validation of U.S. documentation requests by the COS, or his designated representative, of the requesting Station. Because it could be used [...] no U.S. Birth Certificate is issued without approval of the DDO via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards are issued by Office of Security, not TSD.

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division

ATTACHMENT

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals, counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI-type cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, [...] have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished [...] typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and [...] We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U.S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at [...]

White House

Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Representing Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

IV. The United Nations

18 March 1949

The United Nations is already completely discredited in the minds of the Arab Governments and the Arab peoples. There are many reasons for this, but the evidence usually cited is the failure of the UN or the Mediator to enforce UN orders to Israel. For example:

(a) To prevent arms and Czechoslovakian airplanes from reaching Israel.

(b) To deliver the assassins of Count Bernadotte, although their identity is known to hundreds of Jews.

(c) To repatriate or compensate over half a million refugees.

(d) To permit UN observers with Israeli forces when they are on the offensive.

(e) To retire to the lines occupied at the October 14 "cease fire" period.

(f) To evacuate areas given to the Arabs by the UN proposal of November 29, 1947, although at the same time insisting upon invading the Negeb, to excuse which they quote the same UN partition proposal. (The Arab areas occupied in defiance of the UN, include Western Galiles, Jaffa, Nazareth, and villages over the Lebanon frontier.)

(g) To respect the international character of the Jerusalem area.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Carl Duckett brought this up and said he is very uncomfortable with what Sid Gottlieb is reporting and thinks the Director would be ill-advised to say he is acquainted with this program. Duckett plans to scrub it down with Gottlieb but obviously cannot do it this afternoon.

Ben Evans
8 May 1973

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

III. Arab Politics

18 March 1949

Since the Arab military defeats and the complete rebuff of the Arab position at the United Nations Assembly in Paris, the Arab League has practically disappeared as a political force and the several Arab countries are pursuing nationalistic policies looking for allies and friends.

Only Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and perhaps Lebanon have a good chance to succeed in maintaining their independence by following the new isolationist policy. Saudi Arabia alone follows a completely realistic policy of refusing to commit suicide for sentimental or fanatical reasons. Egypt is still internally insecure and with recurring assassinations and riotage may face internal upheaval and the liquidation of the upper classes.

Iraq, potentially wealthy in natural resources, would be the first to fall into Communist control. Although intelligent leaders have managed to hold Syria together, it is believed by some foreign diplomats and many Arab leaders that Syria, as a nation, will break up in two or three years, with autonomous shaikhdoms in Aleppo, Homs and Hama, a Kurdish puppet province in the Jezireh, and with the Jebel Druze delivering Damascus to Abdulla of Trans-Jordan unless the Israelis get Damascus first.

Sensitive Activities

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency transmissions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addresses, e.g., the Soviet TASS Service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POWs in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Monday, November 23, 2009

II. A Long-Range Disaster

18 March 1949

The establishment of the State of Israel by force with intimidation of Arab governments by the US and the USSR, with the cutting off of British arms and ammunition (the Arabs' only source of supply), with ample sources for Israel of munitions and finance, the Israeli battle-victory is complete, but it has solved nothing. If boundaries to an Israeli State, any boundaries, had been set and guaranteed by the Great Powers, peace might return to the area. On the contrary, we have actually a victorious state which is limited to no frontiers and which is determined that no narrow limits shall be set. The Near East is faced with the almost certain prospect of a profound and growing disturbance by Israel which may last for decades.

(a) Instead of restoring the boundaries of the Province of Judea as they were in 70 AD, the Israeli leaders now state freely though usually unofficially, their demand for an ever-expanding empire. Their present possessions are regarded by them as only a beachhead into the Arab and Muslim World -- a large part of which they intend to exploit. They are not prepared to live off what the and will yield as the Arabs do.

(b) The index of the cost of living in Israel has risen to 500% of what it was in that area from 1933 to 1939. Having driven out the Arabs from their homes, Israel lacks cheap labor, and without a very large per capita subsidy the economy of the state would soon collapse. This the Israeli Government intends to prevent by continuing to secure funds from Zionists and other sympathizers abroad by large loans, and as soon as possible, by the exploitation of the Arab hinterland, especially the agriculture and industries of Syria and Iraq.

(c) Alone among the Great Powers, Britain has been working on a plan to restore a balance between the forces in Palestine, but it already appears that this plan is probably doomed to fail. Zionist pressure in the USA, Anglophobia in Iraq and Egypt, and above all, Russia's determination to prolong chaos in the Near East and to complete the discrediting of British and American diplomacy, combine to work against the policy of the British Government and its collaborators -- King Abdulla of Trans-Jordan and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Said.

(d) The duration of the disaster is guaranteed also by the unsolved problem of 700,000 Arab refugees. Whether or not these refugees are fed, clothed, and kept alive for the time being, they remain as a primary source of resentment, distress and continuing expense. No workable plan has been proposed for their resettlement in a gainful livelihood. Israel sneers at the UN order to repatriate or compensate them. Riots have already taken place in some of the refugee camps and refugee leaders have addressed their followers in vituperative language, denouncing Americans, British, Zionists, and Arab League failures, of which they are the helpless victims. They include many intellectuals who are more than ripe for Communist propaganda, some of whom are now meeting regularly in Aleppo.

Questionable NPIC Projects

8 May 1973

1. Leaks of Jack Anderson

In January 1972, NPIC performed image enhancement techniques on TV tapes of a Jack Anderson show. The purpose was to try to identify serial numbers of CIA documents in Anderson's possession. The request was levied on NPIC through the Office of Security.

2. The Poppy Project

NPIC has provided the services of one PI to assist an interagency effort to detect poppy cultivation. In addition the Center has provided the contractual mechanism in support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for a multispectral crop study by a private company.

3. Reviews of NASA Collected Imagery

NPIC has and continues to conduct reviews of satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify "sensitive" frames of photography not releasable to the public and to ascertain the intelligence potential of the imagery. This service has been provided for GEMENI and ERTS photography and preparations are underway for review of SKY LAB imagery.

4. Peaceful Uses of Satellite Imagery

NPIC has been requested to provide a number of looks at domestic coverage for special purposes. Examples include:

- Santa Barbara Oil Spill
- Los Angeles Earthquake
- Sierra Snow (flood threat)
- Current Mississippi Floods
- Hurricane Cammile Damage on the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico
- Civil Disturbance in Detroit
- OEP U.S. Data Base

Sunday, November 22, 2009

Observations Concerning Palestine and the Arab Countries

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

18 Mar 1949

Country: Israel/Arab States

Subject: Observations Concerning Palestine and the Arab Countries

The Military Situation in Palestine

The new State of Israel is strong in military equipment, finances, and morale, and possesses a striking power which could easily seize the remainder of Palestine as well as adjacent parts of Lebanon, Syria, or of Egypt north of the Suez Canal. It is probable that the next military adventure will be to annex the Jerusalem area. The Arabs cannot successfully renew the appeal to arms: they lack unity, leadership, arms and airplanes.

This is a striking reversal of the situation as it was on June 1, 1948. Israel then was screaming to high Heaven for a "cease fire" order from the United Nations, whereupon the Great Powers forced the first truce using explicit threats to Arab countries failing to comply. At that time, the Arabs, assured by treaty with Britain of continued supply of arms and ammunition, were on the offensive, had reached to a point eight miles from Tel Aviv, and had cut to the coast between Haifa and Nakoura. With the truce and its stipulation that neither side should get military advantage of any kind during the truce, Britain suspended the military supplies to the Arabs, previously delivered in accordance with treaty agreements. Meanwhile, however, arms procured from many sources -- including more than fifty Messerschmidt fighters -- poured into Israel. By the time the first truce expired these Messerschmidt fighters took complete control of the air and were able to disperse enemy infantry and to "strafe" Arab towns and villages just as before. Dunkirk and French troops had been rendered impotent by Messerschmidt planes.

Arab morale was further damaged by the success of British diplomacy in detaching Trans-Jordan and Iraq from the joint Arab military program and by the battle defeats inflicted by Israel on the Arabs in the successive seizures by Israel of Arab territory without regard to United Nations orders to retire to positions held at the various "cease fire" dates.

Involvement in Domestic Affairs

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes [...]

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service