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Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD), Office of Communications, Operational Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's [...]

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, [...] where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects [...] and [...] Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects [...]. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an [...] HF/DF system was [...] conducted [...] Division D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

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