Secrets of the CIA

Entities in India and Iran appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and missile-related transfers over the years. There are no publicly available indications of activities related to biological weapons. In the early 1990s, when Iran actively sought nuclear-related assistance and technology from many foreign sources, India appears to have played only a minor role in contrast to other states. India signed an agreement in November 1991 to provide a 10-megawatt research reactor to Tehran, but canceled under pressure from the United States. Nonetheless, India reportedly trained Iranian nuclear scientists in the 1990s.15 More recently, India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated in December 2003 that India “has and would continue to help Iran in its controversial bid to generate nuclear energy.”16 From 1998 to 2003, the United States has imposed nonproliferation sanctions on several different Indian entities for chemical and biological-weapons related transfers to Iraq.17 I

In its semi-annual, unclassified report in 2000 to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction, the CIA identified India, along with Iran and Pakistan, as a “traditional recipient of WMD and missile technology” that could emerge as a new supplier of technology and expertise.14 The unclassified report also noted that “private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia, China, and India may be increasing their involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of technology.” In 2001, the unclassified CIA report noted that “We are increasingly concerned about the growth of ‘secondary proliferation’ from maturing state-sponsored programs, such as those in India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.” Endnotes 14 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 Jul

109th Congress The 109th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23, 2005. In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation.14 In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that “neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission’s recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations.”15 The Administration reportedly rejected the 9-11 Commission’s recommendation to shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DOD.16 110th Congress The 110th Congress saw the enactment of P.L. 110-53, Impleme

Oversight Issues Congress may choose to review past or current paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA and might also choose to assess the extent of coordination between the CIA and DOD. P.L. 108- 458 required that a report be submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005 describing procedures established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD operations. That report provided an opportunity to indicate how initiatives by the executive branch have addressed relevant issues. CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force “on the shelf.” When directed, it has built paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with paramilitary experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in an entity known as the Special Activities Division. The permanent staff would be responsible for planning and for maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military personnel and individuals (including those with s

Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly related to the Agency’s responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however, certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear.8 Additional Strain on SOF Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite training to conduct covert operations.9 They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions. A Reduction in Flexib

SECRET October 1994 Iran's policy of assassinating oppositionists has changed little under President Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani. As the accompanying graphics show, the number of assassinations conducted by Iran has stayed roughly constant during Rafsanjani's tenure. Since 1989, Iran has carried out an average of five assassinations annually, and groups supported by Tehran--particularly radical Turkish Islamists--average another two killings annually. Key targets have remained largely unchanged during Rafsanjani's tenure. Most Iranian assassination targets are members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq or the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I). Iran attacks these two groups much more frequently than the third key Iranian target, supporters of the son of the former Shah of Iran. Some specific targets have changed to adapt to alterations in Iranian foreign policy: Saudi diplomats were attacked during 1989 and 1990--shortly after Saudi Arabia executed the Kuwaiti Shia responsible for b

Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: “Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command.” The 9/11 Commission’s basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build “two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations,” and suggests that we should “concentrate responsibility and necessary legal aut

CIA In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from the Korean War era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD personnel in military operations. On occasion it has also conducted clandestine military operations apart from the military. One example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Especially important was a substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts. The CIA was directed to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official U.S. military intervention in neutral Laos. The CIA’s paramilitary operations in Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban regime by the end of the year. According to media reports, the CIA has also been extensively involved in operations in Iraq in support of militar

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the intelligence threats facing the United States in the new century. In response, Congress approved significantly larger intelligence budgets and, in December 2004, passed the most extensive reorganization of the Intelligence Community since the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter: the “Intelligence Reform Act”) (P.L. 108-458) created a Director of National Intelligence (separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who heads the Intelligence Community, serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the President, and oversees and directs the acquisition of major collections systems. As long urged by some outside observers, one individual is now able to concentrate on the Intelligence Community as a whole and possesses statutory authorities for establishing priorities for budgets, for directing coll

USSOCOM was established by Congress in 1987 (P.L. 99-661, 10 U.S.C. §167). USSOCOM’s stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States.2 The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) to collect intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence from all sources. It was also to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct.” This opaque phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include a range of covert activities such as those that had been carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Although some observers long maintained that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National Security Act was amended (by P.L. 102-88) to establish

On September 16, the Senate approved an amended version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill (S. 1494) on voice vote. The bill would require Senate confirmation of future nominees to head the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Imagery Agency (NGA), and to serve as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It would also strengthen the role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in managing acquisitions of intelligence systems. The two intelligence committees are to be kept informed of all covert actions and other intelligence activities; if the Executive Branch intends not to inform all members of the committees, the committees are to be advised of the “main features” of the activity in a form that could be accessible to all committee members. In a provision that has been under consideration for some years, the bill would establish a statutory Inspector General for the entire Intelligence Com

The U.S. strategy in pursuing the war on international terrorism involves a variety of missions conducted by military and civilian intelligence personnel characterized as “special operations” or paramilitary operations. The separate roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not always clearly reflected in media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap. Proposals such as those made by the 9/11 Commission to change organizational relationships will, however, be evaluated on the basis of separate roles and missions, operating practices, and relevant statutory authorities. DOD defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”1 DOD defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from

The 111th Congress, in its assessment, could deem that the Gang of Eight notification procedure, as currently provided for in statute and by practice, continues to strike a reasonable balance between the twin objectives of operational security and congressional oversight. If, however, changes are sought, Congress could consider the following options. Alternative One Congress could adopt the approach approved by the House Intelligence Committee during its markup of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act. This approach would eliminate the Gang of Eight statutory provision, according to its sponsors, substituting instead a provision that its sponsors said would require that the President brief all members of the congressional intelligence committees, while implicitly providing for the possibility of more restricted briefings pursuant to the written procedures that would be established by the congressional intelligence committees as may be necessary to carry out the statute’s provisions

Notwithstanding the continuing debate over the merits of such notifications, what remains less clear is the historic record of compliance with Gang of Eight provisions set out in statute. Questions include: have such notifications generally been limited to covert actions, ones that conform to congressional intent that such covert actions be highly sensitive and involve the risk to life? When prior notification is limited to the Gang of Eight, has the executive branch provided an explanatory statement as to why it limited notification to the Gang of Eight? If the Gang of Eight is not provided prior notice, has the executive branch then informed the intelligence committees at a later date and provided a reason why prior notification was not provided? Has the Gang of Eight, once notified, ever then made a determination to notify the intelligence committees, a prerogative envisioned by its congressional sponsors? Have the congressional intelligence committees, at any time since they were e

On July 8, 2009, the Executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) 61 in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committee’s action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the President’s senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the Committee’s language was retained in the final bill. According to the executive branch’s statement, the Committee’s new statutory language “... would run afoul of tradition by restricting an important established means by which the President protects the most sensitive intelligence activities that are carried out in the Nation’s vital national security interests... ”62 Although the Executive branch has not issued a Statement of Administration Policy with regard to the Senate’s bill, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair has indicated that he would recommend that the President veto the bill if the covert action notification chan

In its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the Senate Intelligence Committee left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. The Committee adopted language stating that there shall be no exception to the requirements of Title V off the National Security Act to inform the intelligence committees of all covert actions.52 The Committee voted to require that all members of the intelligence committees be notified when the executive branch does not provide information “in full” to all members.53 In such cases, the Director of National Intelligence would be required to provide in writing to the committees in a “timely manner” a statement explaining the reasons for withholding certain information from the full membership and a description of the main features of the covert action in question. The executive branch also would be required to include in reports t

The House Intelligence Committee adopted several additional statutory changes with regard to covert action notifications. One such change would require that the information or material concerning covert actions include any information or material relating to the legal authority under which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any information or material relating to legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert action, including dissenting legal views.46 Another change would require that the President provide Members who are not notified of a particular covert action, pursuant to the procedures established by the each of the committees, with general information on the content of the covert action.47 The Committee also adopted a provision that would permit a member who objects to a particular covert action that has been notified to submit an objection to the Director of National Intelligence. The DNI is required to notify the President of th

In marking up its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Intelligence Committee replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. The current Gang of Eight statutory provision stipulates: If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interest of the United States, the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President40 The substitute language approved by the House Intelligence Committee stipulates: If, pursuant to the procedures establis

During their respective Senate confirmation hearings, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair and CIA Director Leon Panetta criticized the use of the Gang of Eight notification procedure to notify Congress of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) electronic communications surveillance program—often referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP—and the CIA’s detention, interrogation and rendition program. DNI Blair said both programs “... involved sensitive collection activities rather than covert actions. The “Gang of 8” notice is available ... only where notice of covert action is concerned, and its use in these programs was not expressly allowed.”36 Director Panetta said “the NSA surveillance program was not a covert action program, and, therefore, limiting notification to the “gang of eight” was inappropriate.”37 DNI Blair said that, because of the restrictive nature of Gang of Eight notifications in these two instances, “the intelligence committees were prev

The impact of Gang of Eight notifications on the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight continues to be debated. Supporters of the Gang of Eight process contend that such notifications continue to serve their original purpose, which, they assert, is to protect operational security of particularly sensitive covert actions that involve vital U.S. interests while still involving Congress in oversight. Further, they point out that although Members receiving these notifications may be constrained in sharing detailed information about the notifications with other intelligence committee members and staff, these same Members can raise concerns directly with the President and the congressional leadership and thereby seek to have any concerns addressed.30 Supporters also argue that Members receiving these restricted briefings have at their disposal a number of legislative remedies if they decide to oppose a particular covert action program, including the capability to use the appr

Even with statutory arrangements governing covert action, including Gang of Eight covert actions, Congress does not have the authority under statute to veto outright a covert action. Indeed, former Senator Howard Baker successfully pushed the inclusion in the 1980 legislative package of a provision making clear that Congress did not have approval authority over the initiation of any particular covert action.28 Nonetheless, the Gang of Eight Members, as do the intelligence committees, arguably have the authority to influence whether and how such covert actions are conducted over time. For example, Members could express opposition to the initiation of a particular covert action. Some observers assert that in the absence of Members’ agreement to the initiation of the covert action involved, barring such agreement, an administration would have to think carefully before proceeding with such a covert action as planned.29 The Gang of Eight over time could also influence funding for such opera

Congress approved the Gang of Eight notification provision in 1980 as part of a broader package of statutory intelligence oversight measures generally aimed at tightening intelligence oversight while also providing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) greater leeway to carry out covert operations, 23 following a failed covert operation to rescue American embassy hostages in Iran.24 Congressional approval came after President Jimmy Carter decided not to notify the intelligence committees of the operation in advance because of concerns over operational security and the risk of disclosure. Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner briefed the congressional intelligence committees only after the operations had been conducted. Although most members reportedly expressed their understanding of the demands for secrecy and thus the Administration’s decision to withhold prior notification,25 Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Birch Bayh expressed concern that the executive branch’s

During the Senate’s 1980 debate of the Gang of Eight provision, congressional sponsors said their intent was that the Gang of Eight would reserve the right to determine the appropriate time to inform the full intelligence committees of the covert action of which they had been notified.18 The position of sponsors that the Gang of Eight would determine when to notify the full intelligence committees underscores the point that while the statute provides the President this limited notification option, it appears to be largely silent on what happens after the President exercises this particular option. Sponsors thus made it clear that they expected the intelligence committees to establish certain procedures to govern how the Gang of Eight was to notify the full intelligence committees. Senator Walter Huddleston, Senate floor manager for the legislation, said “... the intent is that the full oversight committees will be fully informed at such time the eight leaders determine is appropriate.

Although the statute requires that the President provide the Gang of Eight advance notice of certain covert actions, it also recognizes the President’s constitutional authority to withhold such prior notice altogether by imposing certain additional conditions on the President should the decision be made to withhold. If prior notice is withheld, the President must “fully inform” the congressional intelligence committees15 in a “timely fashion”16 after the commencement of the covert action. The President also is required to provide a statement of the reasons for withholding prior notice to the Gang of Eight.17 In other words, a decision by the executive branch to withhold prior notice from the Gang of Eight would appear to effectively prevent the executive branch from limiting an-after-the-fact notification to the Gang of Eight, even if the President had determined initially that the covert action in question warranted Gang of Eight treatment. Rather, barring prior notice to the Gang of

In addition to having to determine that vital interests are implicated, the President must comply with four additional statutory conditions in notifying the Gang of Eight. First, the President is required to provide a statement setting out the reasons for limiting notification to the Gang of Eight, rather than the full intelligence committees.11 The two intelligence committee chairmen, both Gang of Eight Members, also must be provided signed copies of the covert action finding in question.12 Third, the President is required to provide the Gang of Eight advance notice of the covert action in question.13 And, lastly, Gang of Eight Members must be notified of any significant changes in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding.14 Endnotes 11 National Security Act of 1947 as amended, Sec. 503 [50 U.S.C. 413b] (c) (4). The statute does not explicitly specify whether such a statement should be in writing, nor specifically to

Under current statute, the President generally is required keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions1 and that any covert action2 “finding”3 shall be reported to the committees as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding. If, however, the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding in order to “meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,”4 then rather than providing advanced notification to the full congressional intelligence committees, as is generally required, the President may limit such notification to the “Gang of Eight,” and any other congressional leaders he may choose to inform. The statute defines the “Gang of Eight” as being comprised of the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees and the House and Senate majority and minority leadership.

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte (Phonetic: peenohSHAY) CHILE President: Commander in Chief of the Army Addressed as: Mr. President Army Commander since August 1973, Maj. Gen. Augusto Pinochet became President after he led the September 1973 coup against President (1970-73) Salvador Allende. Pinochet is totally dedicated to the establishment in Chile of a new political and economic order free of all vestiges of Marxism. A man known for his toughness, he will not tolerate any opposition to the government. He is an inflexible anti-Communist and dislikes politicians of all persuasions, blaming them for the chaos that necessitated the Allende overthrow. To international critics, Pinochet is the personification of all the evils they see in Chile, and he is the butt of continual, abusive personal criticism from abroad. Defensive in the face of criticism of his regime, he readily blames such excoriation on an inter

12 April 1993 DRAFT Letter to The Editor The New York Times 229 W. 43rd Street New York, NY 10036 To the Editor: On April 2, you ran an article by Anthony Lewis ("Fear of the Truth"). In the body of that piece, Lewis stated that CIA knew who had killed San Salvador's Archbishop Romero. Lewis stated categorically that at the direction of Robert Gates, the information had been withheld from our intelligence oversight committees. Lewis is categorically wrong. Over the years, US intelligence has contributed substantially to our governments' understanding of human rights violations in El Salvador and elsewhere. In the Romero matter, we can document that when we acquired information about the assassination and the alleged assassin, we promptly sent it to appropriate policy agencies, to two other US intelligence agencies, and to both of our Congressional oversight committees. It is important that the US public understand that neither the CIA nor Robert Gates suppressed infor

13 April 1993 NOTE FOR: DDO FROM: D/PAI I request your concurrence on this draft letter to The New York Times . On 2 April 1993, Anthony Lewis wrote a column (attached) alleging that the Agency withheld intelligence from Congress concerning the assassination of Archbishop Romero in El Salvador in 1980. This draft has been coordinated with DD/OCA [...]. He accompanied me to the SSCI on 12 April, when we showed staffers that the intelligence acquired on the assassination, referred to by Lewis, was provided to the committee (in fact, probably within two weeks after the Field reported it). [...] the staffers said they would not object to our stating that the intelligence was provided to the committee. I am also asking for the DDCI's concurrence on the draft. Then I will give it back to [...] to run by the SSCI before we send it to The New York Times later this week. [...] Att CONCUR: Deputy Director for Operations 16 APR 1993

Counterterrorist Center Commentary 29 April 1993 Summary Preliminary forensic data indicate Iraq provided ordnance to the individuals now in Kuwaiti custody who claim that Baghdad sent them to assassinate President Bush with a car bomb during his 14-16 April visit. [...] US Secret Service and FBI officers are on the way to Kuwait to participate in a coordinated investigation of the incident. (S NF NC OC) * * * * * Overview as of 1600 on 29 April 93 [...] Initial Forensic Data [...] At this time, US Secret Service and FBI officers also are on the way to Kuwait to participate in a coordinated investigation of the incident. Conclusions So Far The car bomb [...] suggests that Iraq has decided to expand both the lethality and the scope of its overseas terrorist operations. Iraq has detonated bombs in Kuwait since the Gulf war, but none as large as the seized car bomb. Iraq also has killed individuals abroad since the war, but only Iraqi emigres. Moreover, if President Bush was the target of

3 November 2003 A panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments Group by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that advances in biotechnology, coupled with the difficulty in detecting nefarious biological activity, have the potential to create a much more dangerous biological warfare (BW) threat. The panel noted: The effects of some of these engineered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man. The genomic revolution is pushing biotechnology into an explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting wave front of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, and widely available to the public that traditional intelligence means for monitoring WMD development could prove inadequate to deal with the treat from these advanced biological weapons. Detection of related activities, particularly the development of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly on more specific human intelligence and, argued panelist

In 1982, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was enacted into law as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. This Act was a response to concerns of members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and others in Congress “about the systematic effort by a small group of Americans, including some former intelligence agency employees, to disclose the names of covert intelligence agents.”2 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report also discussed the efforts of Philip Agee, Lewis Wolf, and others to identify and disclose U.S. intelligence officers as part of “a systematic effort to destroy the ability of [U.S.] intelligence agencies to operate clandestinely,” and their apparent repercussions.3 Such disclosures preceded and may have contributed to circumstances resulting in the death or attempted assassination of some CIA officers, expulsion of others from a foreign country following charges of spying, and impairment of relations with foreign intelligence sources. Two o