Skip to main content

Potential Impacts of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations

Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities
Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly
related to the Agency’s responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some
individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or
supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however,
certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven
important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear.8

Additional Strain on SOF
Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who
are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite
training to conduct covert operations.9 They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations
training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions.

A Reduction in Flexibility
The 9/11 Report notes the CIA’s “reputation for agility in operations,” as well as the military’s
reputation for being “methodical and cumbersome.”10 Some experts question if DOD and SOF
are capable of operating in a more agile and flexible manner. They contend that the CIA was able
to beat SOF into Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which
permitted them to “do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military.”11 Some
are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert operations that they
will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic interference from defense
officials.

SOF Funding Authority
Section 1208 of P.L. 108-375 permits SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups
supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Although not a recommendation in the 9/11
Commission’s report, many feel that this authority will not only help SOF in the conduct of
unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or
clandestine operations. In Afghanistan, SOF did not have the authority to pay and equip local
forces and instead relied on the CIA to “write checks” for needed arms, ammunition, and
supplies.

Endnotes

8 See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century, Staff Study, 104th Cong., 2d sess., April 9, 1996, pp. 201-202.

9 Kibbe, p. 113.

10 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 416.

11 Kibbe, p. 112.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

MKULTRA Proposal - Subproject 133

Proposal entitled [redacted] Submitted on behalf of [redacted] June 1962 DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGY June 14, 1962 Purpose of Study: The purpose of this proposal is a request for financial support to continue an investigation of microbial action on marine manganese nodules and terrigenous mineral sulfides, which the principal investigator has been pursuing since 1958. Very intensive work on these materials is being carried on by him, with fruitful results, during the current year, 1961-62, under a grant from the [...] of Stanford University, California. Since relatively little is known about microbial mineral transformation, and in view of current academic and practical interest of microbiologists, geologists, mining engineers, soil scientists, oceanographers, etc., in the subject, this research should make a valuable contribution to science. Summary of Past Work: a. Bacteriology of mineral sulfides. Attempts were made to evaluate the microbial flora isolable from unsterilized, crushed sulfi

CIA Domestic Activities Timeline - March 1973

1 March 1973 Maury related that former Director Richard Helms has been asked by Senator Fulbright to reappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Maury said that Mr. Helms would probably be queried on the Watergate incident, Agency training of police, and ITT and went on to describe Mr. Helms' anticipated response. Maury reported that Congressman Holifield's staff is anxiously awaiting a letter from the Director in response to the Congressman's written inquiry on police training. The Director noted plans to forward it. 2 March 1973 Maury highlighted yesterday's LIG meeting at the White House and his recommendation that we not provide examples of Congressional leaks of classified information for White House use in reacting to Congressional criticism of the Administration's "indiscretions." The DDS advised that the Office of Security is keeping a reasonably complete record of obvious leaks of intelligence information in the press and elsewhere. 5

Involvement in Domestic Affairs

7 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI 1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper. 2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes [...] 3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.) 4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments fi