A. SRPOINTER
Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.
B. AELADLE
For several years the Office of Security has provided support to Anatole Golitsyn, a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff.
C. REDFACE I
In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved bypassing a contact and sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
In January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security known as [...] and operating as [...]. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) [...] and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.
E. [redacted]
F. MERRIMAC
From February 1967 to November 1971, [...] an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that she was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.
Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.
B. AELADLE
For several years the Office of Security has provided support to Anatole Golitsyn, a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff.
C. REDFACE I
In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved bypassing a contact and sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
In January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security known as [...] and operating as [...]. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) [...] and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.
E. [redacted]
F. MERRIMAC
From February 1967 to November 1971, [...] an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that she was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.
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